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Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance

ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION AND TAX
COMPLIANCE: A TRANSACTIONAL COST PERSPECTIVE
Wei Cui *
(Forthcoming in the University of Toronto Law Journal)

A common phenomenon in tax administration in developing
countries is that tax is collected not according to the rules of law but
according to informal agreements between taxpayers and tax
collectors. This article offers a novel explanation of this phenomenon
in the Chinese context in terms of administrative decentralization.
Administrative decentralization is defined as the concentration of
government functions at the lowest ranks of a geographicallydispersed bureaucracy. Decentralization increases communication
costs associated with the implementation of law, and changes the
structure of taxpayers’ costs in obtaining knowledge about the law.
As a result, a “semi-compliant” type of behavior, involving many
taxpayers who would have been compliant under a rule-based
system, emerges where tax is remitted and collected despite both
sides being under-informed about the law. The article argues that
this dynamic has frustrated tax administration reform in China and,
interestingly, explains the underdevelopment of the tax legal
profession and of tax litigation.
Keywords: Decentralization, informal tax collection, rule of law, tax
administration in developing countries, tax compliance
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INTRODUCTION

A central and persistent theme in economic scholarship on the
role of taxation in economic development is that the capacity of tax
administrations crucially determines the range of tax policy
instruments available in developing countries. 1 For example, in a
recent series of papers and a book, 2 Roger Gordon and others
hypothesize that the state of development of the financial sector
imposes important constraints on tax administration. How valuable
the services are that the financial institutions of a country can
provide to businesses—which is a matter essentially exogenous to
the design of the country’s tax system—determines whether
businesses will choose to use financial intermediation. When
financial sectors are less developed, fewer businesses use financial
services. But if tax collectors cannot rely on the paper trails
generated by businesses’ financial records to audit taxable activities
of most taxpayers, they would have to focus on taxing capitalintensive sectors that either unavoidably use financial services, or in
any case operate in such ways that are easy for tax agencies to
monitor. This, according to these authors, explains the paradoxical
fact that many capital-starved developing countries nonetheless tax
capital intensively.
Nonetheless, many economists admit that tax administration
remains largely a black box for those who study tax policy and
development. A leading expert in the field recently described tax
administration as the “dull but critical job of moving beyond the
moment of innovation to the hard work of implementation,” 3
lamenting that even policy instruments such as the value added tax
(VAT), which is supposed to be relatively easy to administer
(compared to, say, the personal income tax), can under-perform

1

See, e.g. Richard Bird, “Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform” (2004)
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin” 10(3), 134-50 and the extensive literature cited therein.
2
Roger Gordon and Wei Li, “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many
Puzzles and a Possible Explanation” (2009) Journal of Public Economics 93(7-8),
855-866; Gordon and Li, “Puzzling Tax Structures in Developing Countries: A
Comparison of Two Alternative Explanations” (2007) Fiscal Policy And
Management In East Asia, NBER-EASE, vol. 16, 9-35; Roger Gordon, ed,
Taxation In Developing Countries: Six Case Studies And Policy Implications (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010)(hereinafter “Six Case Studies”)
3
Michael Keen, “Taxation and Development – Again” (2012) IMF Working
Papers 12/220, International Monetary Fund, p 14.
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because of limited administrative capacity. 4 Another recent survey
depicts the main challenges facing tax administration in developing
countries as arising from the following factors: (i) the size of the
agricultural and informal sectors; (ii) the (limited) use of financial
services; (iii) the difficulty of restructuring government organization
to suit the need of modern tax administration; (iv) the shortage of
skilled human capital; and (v) the lack of political will to implement
obvious improvement strategies. 5 It can be observed that, of these
five listed factors, most (i.e. (i), (ii), (iv), and (v)) are largely
exogenous to the design of tax administration, 6 while others ((iii) and
possibly (v)) may tell us no more than that some developing
countries failed to adopt the prescriptions of international
organizations. Efforts to theorize about the organization of tax
administration itself are relatively scant. Perhaps as a result, the
recommendations for tax administration reform in developing
countries that have been put forward by international organizations
such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) tend
to be remarkably vague. For example, adopting the VAT was hoped
to “catalyze” administrative reform. 7 Other casual proposals, such as
imposing greater judicial oversight, 8 may be no more than stabs in

4

Id. See also James Alm and Denvil Duncan, Estimating Tax Agency
Efficiency (paper presented at the Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium,
November 7, 2013) (“there has been little systematic analysis of [the tax]
administrative dimension, at least by economists”).
5
Richard M. Bird and Eric M. Zolt, “Technology and Taxation in
Developing Countries: From Hand to Mouse” (2008) National Tax Journal,
LXI(4), 791-821. See also Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, “Why Do
Developing Countries Tax So Little?” (2014) Journal of Economic Perspectives
28(4), 99–120 (discussing the consequence of informal economies and the need for
“political will” in tax policy).
6
Some of the literature on tax and development, especially those generated
under projects sponsored by international organizations, go into much prescriptive
detail about human resource management. See, e.g. Richard Bird and Milka
Casanegra De Jantscher, ed, Improving Tax Administration in Developing
Countries (Washington DC: IMF, 1992). It is not surprising that some scholars
find such studies “dull” (whether or not “critical”).
7
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, Revenue Mobilization in Developing
Countries March 8, 2011 (hereinafter “IMF 2011 Report”) p 10. This recent report
repeatedly mentions administrative reform but does not offer (or cite) any specific
analysis or recommendation.
8
See, e.g. IMF 2011 Report, p 9; Gordon, Introduction to Six Case Studies,
supra note 2, p 7.
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the dark. 9
Indeed, a common response by economists to this lack of
understanding is to take administrative weaknesses in developing
countries as a given, and then to rely on the conceptual tools that
public finance economists are familiar with—varying tax bases and
tax rates, identifying substitute or complementary goods, measuring
elasticities, and so on—to recommend policies that may significantly
deviate from policies normally considered for developed countries.
For example, if the informal sector undermines VAT implementation,
one might switch back to tariffs and excise taxes. 10 The implicit idea
is to find ways of raising revenue despite administrative weaknesses
that plague developing countries, and to return to the improvement of
administration only when these countries are further along the
development path.
In this article, I attempt to motivate a different research strategy,
by showing how one may be able to unpack the black box of tax
administration in developing countries through law and economics
analysis. In particular, I consider a problematic approach to tax
collection, under which revenue is raised not according to the rules
of law but according to informal agreements between the taxpayer
and the tax collector. Such practice, which one might call “non-rulebased” tax collection, has wide manifestations in many countries
(both currently and in the past), and is almost uniformly disparaged
by tax policymakers and administrators in developed countries. 11
Whether such disparagement is justified is a complex question, 12 but

9

As Part IV.B infra argues, administrative configurations can easily preclude
the possibility of judicial oversight, even when judicial institutions are otherwise
readily available.
10
See Joseph Stiglitz, “Development-Oriented Tax Policy”, Chapter 2 in Six
Case Studies, supra note 2. For a critical response to such a proposal, see Michael
Keen, “VAT, Tariffs, and Withholding: Border Taxes and Informality in
Developing Countries” (2008) Journal of Public Economics 92(10-11), 1892-1906.
11
See the Introduction to Six Case Studies 2010 (at 7): “How to improve tax
administration is a difficult problem, and one the present volume only touches on.
One approach mentioned is to improve the incentives faced by tax officials, so that
their objectives will be to enforce the law rather than simply to collect revenue”.
12
See further discussion in Part V infra. The main argument against such
practice is that it is inconsistent with and undermines self-assessment, and
precludes implementing modern tax policy in the way that the rule of law allows.
The practice may also generate corruption, but that problem is regarded here as
second-order, whereas the much more serious problem is that it perpetuates
inefficient taxes and renders the implementation of more efficient modern tax
policy instruments infeasible.
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my purpose is not to evaluate the practice but to explore some of its
causes. I show that this administrative practice can persist even in a
very active economy with a limited informal sector, where revenue is
being successfully raised, and where tax collectors are well-educated
and well-compensated. Moreover, the practice has persisted despite
apparent evidence that the government views it as problematic and
has mobilized political resources to reform it. In the particular
context examined, therefore, this form of tax collection is not
explained by the factors that are normally identified as standing in
the way of improving tax administration.
The particular context in which this article examines the
phenomenon of non-rule-based tax collection is contemporary China.
I argue that in China, a crucial explanation of the phenomenon is a
high degree of administrative decentralization. Moreover, the path of
causation from decentralization to a specific mode of tax collection
runs through behaviors that are of intrinsic importance to legal
systems. Decentralized tax administration fundamentally increases
the costs of communicating the content of law, and alters the
transactions costs for taxpayers to interact with officials in such a
way that a large body of taxpayers may be engaged in a form of
“semi-compliant” behavior—heeding the preferences of local tax
administrators, but in collective ignorance of the law. 13 While the
non-rule-based tax collection that results may have both advantages
and disadvantages, my aim is to identify a cause of this practice in
China in a fundamental institutional arrangement that is not normally
thought to affect tax administration.
The causal connection between non-rule-based tax collection
and decentralization argued for in this article is interesting for a
number of reasons. First, because administrative decentralization has
been the preferred mode of Chinese bureaucratic organization across
regulatory areas, and has specific roots in Chinese history, it may be
viewed as an externally given constraint on the design of tax
administration. 14 Its mechanisms also require investigation at the
institutional level. 15 Therefore, it is a type of “independent variable”
13

As discussed in Parts III.A, IV.A and V, infra, decentralization also
prevents the adoption of some crucial administration techniques that are used in
developed countries.
14
See Part VI infra.
15
Because tax administration in developing countries has been so
impenetrable, commentators on the subject have not been unwilling to tell
anecdotes of random mishaps to illustrate causes of failure of tax administration.
See, e.g. Bird and Zolt, supra note 5, footnotes 12 (clerical staff in Indian tax
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that social scientists would not want to miss. Second, at the same
time, making tax administration less decentralized is also clearly
conceivable, if the government is able to reflect on decentralization’s
relative costs and benefits and to mobilize reform. Decentralization is
thus a kind of determinant of administrative practice that is more
amenable to change than those (such as the informal economy and
the state of development of the financial sector) that scholars of tax
and development have traditionally alluded to. Third, although there
is evidence that China is an international outlier in terms of its degree
of administrative decentralization, 16 the way decentralization leads to
non-rule-based tax collection sheds light on the dimensions of this
latter practice more generally. For example, I argue that such practice
should be distinguished from presumptive taxation, and that it could
create significant social costs even without generating a high level of
corruption. 17 I also argue that the prevalence of such practice is
likely to result in low demand for tax professional services and low
levels of tax litigation—which are themselves important phenomena
of tax systems that have received little theoretical explanation.
The arguments of this article are also relevant to two areas of
legal scholarship other than tax and development. One is the
extensive literature on law and development. Social scientists have
long posited that legal institutions are important for economic
development. 18 But how, and how much, legal institutions matter
have been subject to much debate in recent research. Recent
theoretical work, for example, has highlighted many weaknesses in
the original claims, made by founders of the law and economics
movement like Ronald Coase and Harold Demsetz, about the

agencies punching holes for name tags in diskettes that contained important
taxpayer information) and 15 (employee unplugged and disabled tax agency IT
system when trying to make tea).
16
See discussion in Part II.B infra. This article thus does not aim to establish
an explanation of non-rule-based tax collection that has universal application.
17
See text accompanying note 113 infra. As argued there, presumptive
taxation is a way of applying rules on the basis of limited information, whereas
non-rule-based tax collection is a matter of failing to apply rules even when
information would have been available to tax administrators.
18
See, e.g. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert Vishny, “Law and Finance” (1998) Journal of Political Economy
106:6, 1113-55; Robert Cooter and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Solomon's Knot: How
Law Can End The Poverty of Nations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2013); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, “Institutions as
the Fundamental Cause of Long-run Growth,” in Philippe Aghion and Stephen
Durlauf, ed, Handbook Of Economic Growth (North Holland, 2005).
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functions of property and contract regimes. 19 Consistently with such
theoretical critique, political economy research has found mixed
empirical evidence for the significance of property and contract
enforcement regimes for development. 20 Some political economists
have thus explicitly proposed that legal institutions are of secondary
importance to economic development. 21 This debate, however, has
largely neglected the administrative state in developing countries. As
in developed countries, developing country governments need to rely
on the rule of law to collect modern taxes, pursue environmental and
other regulations, and implement a wide variety of social policies.
Much of the importance of the rule of law in the 21st century is tied
to the regulatory state, 22 and the failure of rule of law within the
spheres of routine government activities can seriously deter or distort
economic development. Yet this has been little examined in law and
development scholarship, which has equated legal mechanisms and
institutions narrowly with the protection of property, contract, and
minority shareholder rights and with judicial independence. This
article, in examining determinants of the capacity of the government
in a developing country to transmit legal information and secure
compliance, begins to fill that gap.

19

See, e.g. David de Meza, “Coase Theorem”, in Peter Newman, ed. The
New Palgrave Dictionary Of Economics and the Law, 1:270–282 (1998) (the
delineation of property rights does not always increase economic inefficiency),
Steven Shavell, Foundations Of Economic Analysis Of Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2004) (tax and regulatory regimes are often superior to
legal systems that only assign and protect property rights); Lisa Bernstein, “Opting
Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry” (1992) Journal of Legal Studies 21:115–157 (informal practices are often
adequate substitutes for formal legal institutions in securing contract performance).
20
See, e.g. Timothy Besley, “Investment Incentives and Property Rights,
Peter Newman, ed. The New Palgrave Dictionary Of Economics and the Law,
2:359–365 (1998)(surveying mixed evidence for the significance of property right
regimes for economic development); Xiaozu Wang, Lixin Xu and Tian Zhu,
“Foreign Direct Investment under Weak Rule of Law: Theory and Evidence from
China” (2012) Economics of Transition 20 (3), 401–424 (finding that variations in
contract protection had no effect on volume of FDI across Chinese cities).
21
See, e.g. Chenggang Xu, “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s
Reforms and Development” (2011) Journal of Economic Literature 49:4, 1076–
1151; Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, “Regional Decentralization
and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style” (2005) Journal of Public
Economics, 89, 1719-1742.
22
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Another research area to which this article contributes is the
study of the Chinese legal system. There has been much controversy
regarding how much progress China has made towards the rule of
law, 23 though foreign scholars tend to be uniform in blaming China’s
authoritarian government for failures to meet rule of law norms.
However, detailed examinations of the rule of law in China have
generally focused narrowly on judicial institutions, despite the facts
that China’s civil law judiciary resembles other government
bureaucracies in many ways, 24 and that the lack of political
independence of the judiciary is by no means unique to China. 25 The
arguments in this article show that conditions for the rule of law may
often be violated in China well before disputes arise and reach courts,
such that the presence or absence of an independent judiciary may be
of secondary significance for important regulatory areas. 26
Moreover, excessive administrative decentralization may have held
back the rule of law in ways that are contrary to the preference of
China’s authoritarian government itself. 27 Insofar as the phenomena
studied in this article have relevance beyond tax administration, 28 it
would seem that moral or ideological critiques of the lack of judicial
independence in China, while correct in their own terms, reflect an
under-appreciation of the fundamental importance of the rule of law
for modern societies.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that, despite
successful revenue mobilization in the last two decades, Chinese tax
policymakers face many of the same challenges confronting their
counterparts in other developing countries, and that serious
constraints on further tax reform arise from problems in tax
administration. Moreover, these problems have persisted despite
eagerness on the part of the Chinese government to tackle them. Nor
23

See, generally, Randall Peerenboom, Judicial Independence in China:
Lessons for Global Rule of Law Promotion (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
24
Donald Clarke, “Empirical Research in Chinese Law”, in Erik Jensen &
Thomas Heller, ed, Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the
Rule of Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003) 164-192.
25
For a careful empirical analysis of the similar lack of independence of the
Japanese judiciary, see J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring
Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan (Chicago, IL:
Chicago University Press, 2003)
26
See Part IV.B infra.
27
See notes 56, 62-66, infra, and accompanying text.
28
This is quite likely, given the general feature of excessive administrative
decentralization in China discussed in Part VI infra.
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are these problems easily attributable to features of the economic
environment. Part II then explains, both qualitatively and using
original quantitative data, how a fundamental facet of Chinese
bureaucratic organization, administrative decentralization, has
shaped tax administration: Chinese tax administration is concentrated
in tax bureaus and “outposts” situated at county and lower
administrative levels, and some core organizational features of such
government units are determined by such decentralization. Part III,
the core of this article, analyzes conceptually the impact of
decentralization on transactional costs in the implementation of law.
It defines the concepts of the communication and advisory costs of
implementing law, and offers a theoretical analysis of how, by
changing these costs, decentralization results in non-rule-based
collection practices and a form of semi-compliant behavior.
Part IV then offers indirect evidence of the theory in Part III, by
arguing that decentralization, and the non-rule-based collection
practices it creates, also explain the under-development of the tax
profession and the under-use of judicial monitoring in China. Part V
considers certain alternative explanations, characterizations, and
evaluations of non-rule-based collection practices. Part VI briefly
examines the institutional and historical reasons why Chinese tax
administration is so decentralized. A brief Conclusion follows.
I.
TAX ADMINISTRATION AS A BOTTLENECK ON TAX REFORM: THE
CHINESE CASE
A recent OECD report on tax policy and reform in China states
that “China’s tax regime has raised an increasing amount of tax
revenues in relation to GDP over the past 20 years to…support
development while at the same time maintaining sound public
finances.” 29 This positive assessment is based on such facts as that,
in each year after 1997, growth in tax revenue in China has outpaced
even its recording-setting GDP growth—very often by a wide
margin. 30 In one sense, therefore, the tax system in contemporary
China seems to have already dealt with the grave challenge believed

29

Bert Brys, et al, Tax Policy and Tax Reform in the People's Republic of
China, OECD Taxation Working Papers No. 18 (September 2013), available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/tax-policy-and-tax-reform-in-the-people-srepublic-of-china_5k40l4dlmnzw-en.
30
Id, at 7 (Figure 2).
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to confront many developing countries, which is to mobilize
sufficient revenue to fund basic public expenditures. 31
Nonetheless, as the OECD report goes on to discuss—and as
other recent studies of contemporary Chinese public finance have
also concluded 32—the Chinese tax system has much more in
common with other large developing or transitional economies than
with a typical OECD country. This can be seen first through the
mixture of taxes. The Chinese corporate income tax raises more than
three times the revenue that is yielded by the personal income tax. 33
This is a pattern widely observed in developing countries and stands
in sharp contrast to the pattern in developed countries. 34 Indirect
taxes—the value added tax (VAT), sales taxes, and various excises—
in turn represent a far greater share of total revenue than all taxes on
income, which is again a distinguishing feature of the tax structures
in developing countries in comparison with developed countries. 35
When compared to the OECD countries, the percentages to overall
revenue of social security contributions and property taxes are also
low in China, 36 as is the overall ratio of tax revenue to GDP. 37 It is
not clear, therefore, that China’s success at revenue mobilization can
be attributed to the adoption of any distinctive tax policy relative to
other developing countries. Moreover, revenue collection falls well
short of meeting the expenditure goals that the government has set
for itself. 38
Beyond the tax mix, the Chinese tax system also has much in
common with developing countries in terms of tax administration.
31

Clemens Fuest and George R. Zodrow, e.d. Critical Issues in Taxation and
Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 3.
32
See, e.g. the essays collected in Jiwei Lou and Shuilin Wang, ed, Public
Finance in China (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2008).
33
See Brys, et al, supra note 30, Section 1.3
34
See Vito Tanzi and Howell Zee, “Tax Policy for Emerging Markets:
Developing Countries” (2000) National Tax Journal, 53 (2), 299-328, at 307. The
pattern also implies a much higher level of capital taxation than is regarded as
optimal under conventional economic theory. Id, at 305.
35
Richard Bird, “Tax Challenges facing Developing Countries: A
Perspective from Outside the Policy Arena” (2011) Background paper prepared for
the UK Department for International Development (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393991), at 17. This typically implies more regressive
tax structures than observed in developed countries.
36
For low use of property taxation in developing countries, see Tanzi and
Zee, supra note 35, at 300.
37
Athar Hussain and Nicholas Stern, “Public Finances, the Role of the State,
and Economic Transformation, 1978–2020,” in Lou and Wang, supra note 33.
38
Id.
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This in a way is predictable, if theorists of tax and development are
generally right that tax administrative capacity is the most important
determinant of tax structure in developing countries. 39 While it is not
the intention of this article to provide a detailed description or
evaluation of Chinese tax administrative practices, a few examples
will be offered below to illustrate the point. Before going into the
examples, however, it is worth noting that when features of tax
policy design are determined by tax administrative capacity,
important implications follow for evaluating the economic efficiency
of these features. Generally, taxes that are inefficient and
distortionary in one set of circumstances (e.g. an economic
environment characterized by perfectly competitive markets and no
externalities) may be efficient and optimal in another (e.g. an
environment characterized by imperfect competition, externalities,
and/or pre-existing distortions induced by tax and other regulatory
policies). 40 Therefore it may not be possible, in the abstract, to say
whether a tax mix (such as the one described of China above) is
socially optimal or not. However, where tax policy options are
limited by administrative constraints and where policies adopted
mainly respond to such limitations, then it is less likely that a policy
that looks sub-optimal is in fact optimal (i.e. as a matter of the
second best, given other pre-existing distortions). 41 Accordingly, the
discussion below emphasizes how methods of Chinese tax
administration have shaped the substance of Chinese tax law.
A first example is the administration of China’s VAT, the largest
source of revenue for the government. 42 VAT administration is
handled by a large and well-resourced bureaucracy, the State Tax
Bureau (or STB) system. 43 There is, however, very little VAT audit
capacity. Instead, VAT collection relies almost entirely on a unique
“golden tax project” (GTP), where sales and purchases are monitored
39

See literature cited in notes 1-2 supra.
Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second
Best” (1956) The Review of Economic Studies 24(1), 11-32.
41
See Part V infra for further discussion.
42
For an overview of the substantive rules of the Chinese VAT, see Wei Cui
and Alan Wu, “China”, Chapter 6 in T. Ecker, M. Lang and I. Lejeune (Eds.), The
Future of Indirect Taxation: Recent Trends in VAT and GST Systems around the
World (Kluwer, 2011), pp 159-89. For a discussion of the most important
departures of the Chinese VAT from international VAT norms, see Alan Schenk,
Victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, Value Added Tax: A Comparative Perspective, 2d
ed (Cambridge University Press, 2015) Chapter 14.
43
See note 61 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the STB
system.
40
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and verified by tax agencies using an extensive system of encryption
devices, specially printed invoices, and computerized crosschecking. 44 As “high-tech” as this may sound, in reality the GTP’s
main function is to prevent criminal tax fraud (i.e. deductions and
VAT refunds claimed when no purchases have been made),
something that most other countries prevent by carrying out VAT
audits. 45 Whether or not the GTP is successful in stopping criminal
VAT fraud in China is controversial. 46 What is not controversial is
that the GTP imposes heavy compliance burdens on all taxpayers,
including generally compliant ones, through requirements to record
and report sales and purchases that meet the government’s
technological specifications. 47 It has been noted that the GTP goes
against the general conception of the VAT as based on selfassessment. 48 At the same time, the GTP is for most intent and
purposes the only way in which tax agencies monitor VAT
compliance. 49 Because of the limits of tax administrators’ audit
capacity, Chinese VAT rules are rife with restrictive conditions that
seriously impede businesses’ capacity to claim VAT credits for
purchases made. 50 This is so much the case that taxpayers, tax
professionals, and even tax policymakers and academics in China
44

See Jane Winn and Angela Zhang, “China’s Golden Tax Project: A
Technological Strategy for Reducing VAT Fraud” (2013) 4 Peking University
Journal of Legal Studies 1; Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Section V.
45
Graham Harrison and Russell Krelove, “VAT Refunds: A Review of
Country Experience” (2005) International Monetary Fund Working Paper
WP/05/218; Liam Ebrill, et al, The Modern VAT (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2001),
Chapter 14.
46
Signs that it is not include (i) an extensive and harsh legal regime dealing
with the “sham issuances” of VAT invoices, which cannot be controlled by the
GTP, (ii) continued government reports of a high level of criminal activity, despite
the fact that features of the Chinese VAT regime (such as unavailability of VAT
refunds for domestic supplies) already limit the payoff for such activity. See
Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Section VI.
47
See EY, A Look inside China’s VAT System: Understanding How the
Regime Works to Effectively Manage VAT Risks and Opportunities (March
2013),
available
at
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/China_VAT_system_en/$FILE/Chin
a_VAT_system_en.pdf (highlighting the burdens and risks created by the Golden
Tax Project).
48
See Ebrill, et al, supra note 46, Chapter 13.
49
A term widely used by Chinese tax agencies to characterize their own
strategy of administration captures this fact concisely: “Using invoices to control
tax compliance” (yipiao kongshui).
50
See Schenk et al, supra note 43, Chapter 14, Sections VI.A, VI.C, and
VII.B.
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widely believe that the burden of the VAT is borne by businesses,
and not by final consumers, 51 which is extraordinary given the
typical international understanding of the VAT as a tax on final
consumption. Much of this understanding, and the rules and practices
that sustain it, can be traced to China’s approach to VAT
administration.
A second example is offered by the administration of the
business tax (BT), a cascading tax that substitutes for the VAT in the
service sector and in dealing with real property transactions. The
Chinese BT is also collected with virtually no audit nor selfassessment. Most of the time, the only way in which that the
government verifies that a transaction has occurred (for both the
vendor and the customer) is that a special form of invoice is issued.
No tax returns or accounting book entries are used. Quite often, BT
invoices are obtained by enterprises from tax agencies—and the tax
amount paid when such invoices are obtained—on the basis of
estimated sales revenue, which can deviate significantly from actual
revenue. 52 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, two thirds of the
nation’s BT revenue is collected from financial services, real estate,
and construction, sectors that are generally capital-intensive and easy
to monitor by tax collectors. The effective tax rate on other services
(especially consumer services) is likely quite low. This had made it
politically and administratively difficult to integrate the VAT and the
BT, even though the differential tax treatment of goods and services
increasingly generate distortions. 53
Third, personal income tax revenue is collected largely through
withholding, whereas the annual return-filing and self-declaration
requirements imposed on high-income taxpayers since 2007 still
generate no additional revenue. As a result, many tax policy
options—such as deductions or credits for dependents, deductions
for investment losses, etc.—are simply precluded by administrative
limitations, whether or not they are desirable from a policy
51

For a discussion of the prevalent belief in China that the VAT is a tax on
businesses and not on final consumption, see Wei Cui, “China’s Business-Tax-toVAT Reform: an Interim Assessment” (2014) British Tax Review 2014(5), 617641.
52
This has fueled a large black market in which tax invoices are traded. See
David Barboza, “Coin of Realm in China Graft: Phony Receipts”, New York
Times, August 3, 2013.
53
See Cui, supra note 51. In comparison to the VAT, the BT imposes
relatively low compliance costs. This aggravates the gap in treatment between
supplies subject to the VAT and those subject to the BT.

Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance

14

perspective. The tax on business income earned by sole proprietors,
the only source of tax on personal income that is not collected
through withholding, is collected either through presumptive taxation
methods or through flawed auditing that relies almost exclusively on
invoices. 54
These patterns that one observes in the administration of some of
China’s largest taxes are, not surprisingly, also found in collection
practices for the smaller taxes as well. Indeed, it is possible to make
a generalization across tax types: Chinese tax administration at the
moment generally relies very little on taxpayer self-assessments or
on audits. 55 This implies that in routine tax compliance, taxpayers
generally transmit relatively little information about their business
activities that should determine their tax liabilities, and tax collectors
also generally do little to enhance such information through
investigations. Even when revenue is coming in for the tax
authorities, information is not. Moreover, collection practices differ
little for highly compliant taxpayers and those that are riskier. These
features of tax administration impose serious constraints on the
further development of tax policy. In the field of indirect taxes, they
prevent more uniform (and less distortive) tax treatments of goods
and services. In the field of direct taxes, they limit the size of the
personal income tax base and preclude more progressive taxation
both within the income tax itself and in the tax system overall. 56
54

Generally, the use of indirect tax invoices has seriously undermined
income tax compliance on the part of businesses (whether or not incorporated):
instead of auditing taxpayer accounts and determining whether claimed expenses
correspond to real business outlays, tax collectors grant or deny deductions for
income tax purposes based entirely on whether invoices in the right proportions are
presented. For most businesses, therefore, compliance under the income tax
involves not maintaining truthful and accurate accounting entries, but assembling
invoices (whether for genuine transactions or purchased through the black-market).
Where tax agencies cannot be assured of compliance through controlling the use of
invoices, arbitrary limitations on deductible expenses are adopted to prevent
revenue loss.
55
As pessimistic as the above appraisal sounds, it is in fact not too different
from the Chinese government’s own assessments. See State Administration of
Taxation (SAT), Notice Regarding Conducting Research on Crucial Issues in
Deepening Tax Administrative Reform (Guoshuibanhan [2012]127), May 17,
2012; SAT, Plan for Further Deepening Tax Administration Reform (Discussion
Draft, November 2012, on file with author). The latter document acknowledges
many of the weaknesses in tax administration just described.
56
For the regressivity of the Chinese tax system, see Azizur Khan and Carl
Riskin, “Growth and Distribution of Household Income in China between 1995
and 2002” (2007) in Inequality and Public Policy in China, eds. Gustafsson, Bjorn,
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These features, of course, also characterize tax administration in
most developing countries. 57 Now, in many ways, these
commonalities in tax administration between China and other
developing countries should be surprising. China has one of the
smallest shadow economies among all developing countries. 58 Its
agricultural sector represents only 10% of GDP, and its financial
sector is relatively developed. 59 The country also enjoys a relatively
high literacy level. In addition to these well-known facts, it is also
important to note that Chinese tax administration has experienced
dramatic improvements in its human capital in the last decades. As
recently as in 1997, the percentage of formal, permanent employees
of Chinese tax agencies who had a post-secondary degree (junior
college, college, or higher) was merely 40%. As of 2010, that
percentage has climbed to 90%. Chart 1 illustrates this impressive
trend for one of the two parts of Chinese tax administration, the state
tax bureau (STB) system. 60 Chart 2, depicting changes in the age
composition of STB employees, suggests that Chinese tax
administrators have tended to stay in their jobs, accumulating years
of experience and retiring later. 61 In general, tax bureaus are also
regarded as attractive employers and are among the top choices for
young people entering the competitive civil service exam each

Li Shi, and Terry Sicular, 35–60 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
57
See e.g. Bird, supra note 1, at 248; IMF 2011 Report, supra note 7, at 10;
Bird, supra note 35, at 45-46.
58
See Friedrich Schneider, et al, “Shadow Economies All over the World:
New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007” (2010) World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 5356, p 22 (finding that).
59
For a recent, generally positive assessment of financial sector development
in China, see World Bank/IMF, “China: Financial Sector Assessment” (2011)
(available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WBChinas-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Report.pdf)
60
The STB and LTB systems are primarily distinguished by the types of
taxes they collect: STBs collect taxes the revenue of which went exclusively or in
large part to the central government, whereas LTBs collected mostly taxes the
revenue of which was primarily claimed by sub-national governments. As of 2010,
the STB system is larger in terms of staff size by approximately 50,000 persons,
and also collected more than twice the amount of tax revenue than the LTB
system.
61
Similar patterns hold for the other part of Chinese tax administration, the
local tax bureau (LTB) system, although they are not displayed here. The figures in
Charts 1 and 2, as well as similar analyses for LTB personnel trends, are based on
an original dataset on the composition of Chinese tax agency personnel from 1993
to 2010 compiled by the author.
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year. 62 All of these features of the Chinese economy and its tax
administration workforce suggest that China should be further along
the path of relying on self-assessment and audits than it is, and that
the Chinese government should be gathering more information about
its taxpayers than it actually does. Why is this not the case?

Adding to the puzzle is that fact that the combination of
voluntary compliance with risk-based administration was actually the
central goal of previous tax administration reforms. 63 Yet this goal
has continuously eluded reformers. In the early and mid-1990s, the

62

For a recent discussion of the importance of pecuniary incentives in tax
administration, see Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja, and Benjamin A. Olken,
“Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax
Collectors” (2014) NBER Working Paper No. 20627.
63
See, e.g. The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and
Commercial Tax System (adopted by the SAT on Dec. 11, 1993, and approved by
the State Council on Dec. 25, 1993); Notice of the State Council Forwarding the
State Administration of Taxation’s Agenda for Deepening the Reform of Tax
Administration (Guobanfa [1997]1, January 23, 1997)
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State Administration of Taxation (SAT, the national ministerial
agency supervising most tax collection in China 64) several times
obtained political endorsement from the highest levels for its vision
of developing a tax system that is built on self-assessment, audits,
taxpayer service, and the rule of law. 65 The Law on the
Administration of Tax Collection, which remains to be one of the
few national statutes governing tax matters in China today, was
enacted in 1992 to empower tax administrators in a new market
economy. It was then extensively amended in 2001 to give tax
agencies greater capacity to gather taxpayer information and enforce
tax law. A fundamental tax reform in 1994, as well as a well-known
government-wide effort to improve administrative efficiency in
2000, 66 gave the tax bureaucracy opportunities to carry out major
organizational and personnel changes. 67 Thus whatever has held
back the development of modern tax administration in China, it is not
for the lack of “political will” in any obvious sense of the term.
In summary, all of the usual suspects that purportedly obstruct
sound tax administration in developing countries cannot explain
China’s failure to implement a system based on self-assessment and
risk-based management informed by taxpayer data. The aim of the

64

Indirect taxes imposed on imports and exports of goods are collected by
customs agencies. For more on the SAT, see note 86 infra and accompanying text.
65
The Chinese government’s strategy for improving tax administration in the
1990s would probably meet the approval of most specialists in tax administration.
The 1997 reform of tax administration, the implementation of which was
completed in the early 2000s, included four components: (i) establishing a system
of voluntary tax declaration and centralized tax payment, which replaced a prior
system under which tax was assessed to and collected from specific taxpayers by
individual tax administrators; (ii) investing in taxpayer services, including the
publication of law, regulations and administrative guidance, and the setting up of
taxpayer service centers, so as to facilitate self-compliance; (iii) developing
computerized systems in which taxpayer information can be stored and analyzed,
enabling tax agencies to monitor taxpayer compliance; and (iv) developing audit
functions directed both at regular tax filing and compliance by taxpayers, and at
specific industries and taxpayer types (based on risk), in addition to investigating
serious non-compliance. In implementing all of these strategies, the rule of law
was to be a guiding principle. See Guobanfa [1997]1, supra note 63.
66
See Erik Brødsgaard Kjeld, “Institutional Reform and the Bianzhi System
in China” (2002) 170 The China Quarterly 361-386.
67
Throughout this process, the design of tax administration in China also
received important support (both intellectual and financial) from the United
Nations Development Program, the IMF, the World Bank and even the Japanese
government. SAT, Outline of the Strategic Plan for China’s Tax Collection and
Administration for 2002-2006, Guoshuihan [2003]267, March 10, 2003.
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next three Parts of this article is to identify a culprit missing from the
purview of received wisdom.
Before setting out in this investigation, two preliminary remarks
are in order. First, because the Chinese government itself views
taxpayer self-assessment and risk-based administration as the goal of
administrative reforms, and because this is consistent with the
mainstream views of international organizations such as the IMF and
the OECD, I occasionally speak of “improving” or “modernizing”
tax administration as though the superiority of self-assessment and
risk-based administration is unquestioned. 68 This is strictly speaking
unnecessary, since the main arguments of the article are about the
causes of non-rule-based tax collection, however the latter is
evaluated. For these arguments to be of interest, it is enough that
non-rule-based tax collection arises not by design (i.e. not because it
is deliberately adopted).
Second, what is the connection between modern tax
administration—supposing that means self-assessment and riskbased administration—and rule-based administrative practices? The
connection seems fundamental: the rule of law seems to be a
necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for self-assessment and
risk-based administration. For self-assessment to be possible,
taxpayers need to be able to determine their tax liabilities based on
published rules. In turn, risk-based administration means focusing
administrative resources on detecting and punishing those who do
not follow the rules. 69 It is difficult to conceive of a system of
voluntary compliance where rules are either not known or not
enforced. The suggestion here is not to blame unsuccessful tax
administration on the weakness of the rule of law, as though the
latter is an independently given trait of the social environment in
which tax administrators operate. 70 Instead, Parts II-IV will highlight
tax administrative techniques and organizational configurations that
directly affect people’s attitudes towards the law and their
compliance behavior, and it is such basic attitudes and behavior that
give content to the concept of rule of law relevant here.

68

Part V discusses a dissenting view.
For further elaboration, see paragraph accompanying note 137 infra.
70
Nor are all components of the multi-faceted concept of rule of law
relevant. For example, as will be argued in Part IV.B, whatever weaknesses are
suffered by the Chinese judiciary are unlikely to have contributed to the current
problems of tax administration.
69
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II. DECENTRALIZATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CHINESE TAX
ADMINISTRATION
The culprit I am about to identify for the difficulties in
improving Chinese tax administration is excessive decentralization.
The term “decentralization”, however, means very different things to
different people, and when these meanings are not adequately
specified, some might find it surprising to hear that
“decentralization” can be a bad thing, and that “centralization” is
what I will propose for curing administrative maladies. The goal of
this Part is to clarify the specific meaning of administrative
“decentralization” in China, both in concrete organizational details
and in systematic, quantitative terms. I begin by showing how a
county-level tax bureau in China is organized. As discussed below,
the majority of Chinese tax administrators—some 400,000 of them—
work at these county-level tax agencies. Alongside another large set
of tax administrators that staff below-county-level “outposts”, they
constitute the frontline of the tax bureaucracy dealing with taxpayers
on a daily basis. What county-level tax bureaus (and their subsidiary
“outposts”) do—and don’t do—have a decisive influence on Chinese
taxpayers’ compliance options.
A. County-Level Tax Bureaus, Outposts, and the Meaning of
Decentralization

China has 2,856 county-level jurisdictions. County-level tax
bureaus constitute, in Chinese bureaucratic parlance, the lowest level
of “all-purpose” bureaus. That is, such bureaus play many roles, and
the first among these roles is typically embodied physically in a tax
service center, a building (often a big and bustling place) where
businesses register for tax purposes, file monthly, quarterly or other
periodic returns, make actual payments for taxes (and fines and
penalties), apply for special tax treatments, and purchase or replenish
their supplies of tax invoices. The central government pushed for
establishing these tax service centers across China during the 1997
reform of tax administration, in order to ensure that payments of tax
are centralized (to prevent corruption and embezzlement), and to
make possible taxpayer voluntary compliance. 71
71

See supra note 65. This aspect of the 1997 reform was arguably
successful.
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Yet the administrative heart of the county bureau is not the tax
service center. It is instead an internal division for taxpayer
management. This division fulfills an extremely broad set of
functions, 72 including: managing taxpayer registration, reviewing
and verifying tax returns, carrying out routine inspections, making
assessments, determining penalties, giving publicity to tax law, and
providing taxpayer education, training, and other services. Moreover,
taxpayer management divisions (at least in theory) are expected to
conduct taxpayer research, gather information about the business
activities and accounts of taxpayers in their jurisdictions, provide
summaries of compliance by individual taxpayers and withholding
agents, produce indicators concerning local economic performance
and sectoral average tax burdens, and compare such indicators with
information provided by superior units as well as other government
agencies and sources of tax-related information.
This broad range of duties encompasses both relatively menial
and rather advanced administrative tasks. Included among the latter
are what internationally would be thought of as “desk audits”, as well
as the selection of taxpayers for more intensive audits, and the
conduct of some field audits. 73 However, given their quite
comprehensive job description, taxpayer management divisions are
remarkably internally undifferentiated. There is no general practice
for setting up internal sub-divisions to deal with different types of
taxes 74 or of taxpayers. Instead, the allocation of work within
taxpayer management divisions usually follows the “taxpayer
manager system”. That is, each individual staff member is designated
to be the manager for a portfolio of specific taxpayers, with each
portfolio comprising up to hundreds of businesses. With respect to
the multitude of taxpayers in her portfolio, each manager assembles

72

SAT, Recommendations Regarding Further Standardizing the Internal
Organization and Clearly Delineating the Duties and Divisions of Labor within the
State Tax Bureau System (Guoshuifa [2004] 125, Sep. 3, 2004)
73
China has designated a special kind of tax audit or inspection, shuiwu
jicha, to be carried out by a separate system—the system of tax inspection
bureaus—operating independently from all-purpose tax bureaus. Inspection
bureaus at least historically have focused on tax frauds and outright tax evasion,
and their audits/investigations are generally not ongoing with respect to most
taxpayers. Therefore, whatever risk-based administrative practices may develop in
China, they are likely to emerge primarily in the taxpayer management divisions.
74
Although the bifurcation of tax administration into the state tax bureau and
local tax bureau systems is based on tax types (see note 60 supra), each system
administers quite a variety of different taxes.
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information and makes general assessments of their level of
compliance, as well as provide taxpayer services upon request. 75
The taxpayer manager system thus establishes, for each business
taxpayer, access to a tax administrator. And each such administrator
is responsible for supervising the compliance of a sizeable
population of taxpayers, often with respect to multiple types of taxes.
This unusual arrangement raises the question: Why is the taxpayer
manager system adopted? Why is it that everyone in the taxpayer
management division generally does the same thing, just covering
different specific taxpayers? What, for example, prevents a taxpayer
management division from establishing various sub-divisions, so as
to enable greater specialization among staff members?
These questions can be answered only by attending to the
fundamental phenomenon of administrative decentralization. A
county-level tax bureau is already at such a low rank within the
Chinese state that an internal division of it, such as a taxpayer
management unit, almost could not have a separate official rank. 76
Therefore, subdivisions of a taxpayer management division would
not be hierarchical. 77 It is also not possible, to circumvent this
problem of not being able to create hierarchies below a division that
are required by specialization, simply to have more divisions within
a county-level tax bureau. Again because a county-level bureau sits
at such a low level of the bureaucratic scale, there are general
75

To prevent corruption, tax managers are rotated every two years among
different portfolios of taxpayers. They also generally do not collect tax payments,
nor issue penalties, nor negotiate tax reductions or settlements. Instead, they may
conduct field inspections and issue reports on taxpayers on the basis of such
inspections.
76
A name for such a division, “gu”, had to be invented in administrative
practice so as to give some recognition to the leader of the division. The rank of a
“gu” is not formally recognized in the Civil Servant Law. Essentially, a “gu” is the
lowest tier of bureaucratic organization at which a leader may be designated; no
differentiation of rank in civil service, and only minute differences in pay scale, are
possible below a “gu”.
77
It might be argued that a non-hierarchical division of labor is conceivable,
and therefore the infeasibility of hierarchy does not explain the lack of division of
labor. That is, it is conceivable for a group of civil servants (say 30 people) all at
the lowest bureaucratic ranks to divide up specialization within themselves, so that
some are responsible for taxpayer registration, some for providing information for
each type of taxes, some for audits, and others for revenue and taxpayer data
analysis, and so on. (Such internally specialized cells would also have to be
systematically replicated across the country). While conceivable, it is difficult to
think of real-world embodiments of such organizational structures within
bureaucracies anywhere.
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limitations—imposed not on tax administration alone but on all
government agencies—as to how many internal divisions it can have.
As all-purpose bureaus are generally expected to have numerous
other divisions, 78 further division of labor within taxpayer
management is bureaucratically not feasible.
Now, Chinese counties can be quite large, in terms of both
population and the size of their economies. Thus even though there
are close to 3000 county-level jurisdictions in the country, for much
of the Chinese population and many Chinese businesses, the county
government is not “low down”, but “high up”. This reality is
certainly reflected in tax administration: for many Chinese taxpayers,
the real face of the tax system is not the county-level tax bureau, but
a large network of branch tax bureaus and tax offices/stations, each
covering three to five township-level jurisdictions. 79 These are called
“outposts”, 80 and their broad functions essentially match those
carried out by the taxpayer management divisions of county-level
bureaus. 81 Like taxpayer management divisions of county-level
bureaus, outposts also follow the taxpayer manager system, with
individual administrators comprehensively covering portfolios of
taxpayers. Similarly, at most one person in each outpost has a title (at
the lowest possible rank) of a “leader”, while the rest of the
employees are, to put it bluntly, bureaucratic nobodies. 82
By contrast to both outposts and county-level bureaus, tax
bureaus at higher levels—including prefectural/municipal
78

These typically include a legal and policy division (staffed by a few
individuals who provide legal advice to taxpayer managers and handle formal
appeals when they arise); a planning and accounting division; a central clerical
office; and one or two other divisions that that handle internal administrative
matters, including personnel and anti-corruption supervision.
79
There are 40,906 township-level jurisdictions in China as of 2010.
80
Outposts are not “all-purpose”: while some outposts in remote areas also
process actual tax payments, no outposts contain legal, planning, personnel, and
clerical functions.
81
These range from field inspections of taxpayer business activities and
accounts, assembling and analyzing compliance data, comparing such data with
data provided by superior agencies or other government agencies to detect tax
evasion, and liaising with the legal and revenue planning divisions of county-level
bureaus to address commonly observed issues in tax collection.
82
Outposts and taxpayer management divisions within the same jurisdiction
would normally not duplicate taxpayer portfolios. They are thus substitutes, and
collectively carry out “taxpayer management”. One difference between the two,
especially in the Local Tax Bureau system, is that outposts may be partially funded
by lower-than-county-level government, and may need to attend to the revenue
targets and needs of these lower-level governments.
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jurisdictions and, above them, provincial-level jurisdictions 83—
generally do not directly face taxpayers. Instead, they perform a large
range of policy, political, and superior administrative functions, such
as determining the internal organization of lower-level agencies,
budgeting, and appointment. These bureaus are permitted to have a
greater number of internal divisions due to these additional functions,
and their internal divisions also enjoy higher bureaucratic ranks.
They have even been permitted to have specialized divisions
handling international tax matters, but a proposal in 2002 to set up
large-taxpayer units at these higher-level bureaus was never
implemented. 84
The foregoing outline of the allocation of administrative
functions along the hierarchy of subnational tax administration
allows us to define the phenomenon of “administrative
decentralization”, which, the rest of the article will argue,
substantially accounts for the difficulties China has encountered in
modernizing tax administration in recent years. The meaning of
decentralization can be broken into two components. First, there is a
single bureaucratic hierarchy, and decentralization means that
government functions viz-a-viz citizens are performed at the lower
levels of the hierarchy. By contrast, higher levels of the bureaucracy
do not exercise government power with respect to citizens directly,
but instead issue commands to bureaucratic subordinates. Second,
the lower the bureaucratic rank, the more geographically dispersed
are units within that rank, and the smaller is their geographical
jurisdictional reach. Decentralization thus implies that the scope of
functions of a particular, citizen-facing government unit is usually
delineated by reference to the finer geographic divisions of
government. What is unusual about China is first, how deep (i.e.
multilayered) the bureaucratic hierarchy is, and second, how
resolutely the tasks of tax administration are placed at the bottom
ranks of the hierarchy. 85
83

As of 2013, China has 31 provincial-level jurisdictions and 333 prefecturelevel (including large municipal) jurisdictions. In the following, the terms
“prefecture” and “municipal” are used interchangeably to denote a level of
government (where they exist) intermediate between the county and the provincial
levels.
84
Even the existing international tax divisions at these higher-level bureaus
play mere advisory roles (similar to legal and policy departments), instead of
taking over tax administration entirely from county- or lower-level agencies.
85
As discussed in Part VI infra, decentralization is a general characteristic of
the Chinese administrative state in the performance of most government functions.
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Table 1 lays out certain quantitative information about the
organization of Chinese sub-national tax administration in 2010. The
italicized rows in the table correspond to tax administration units at
the county level or below. It is apparent that most all-purpose tax
bureaus lie at the county level, two levels down from provincial tax
agencies. Moreover, by far the largest category of tax agencies
consists in outposts.

Table 1: Tax Bureaus at Different Levels of Government, 2010

Provincial bureaus and bureaus for
cities with quasi-provincial status
Prefecture bureaus
Bureaus in districts of directlycontrolled municipalities, of cities
with quasi-provincial status, and of
prefectures
County bureaus
Branches, offices, and other outposts

STB System
46

LTB System
45

336
1073

317
748

2054
10507

1949
18178

B. The Extent of Decentralization

So far, I have said very little about tax administration at the
national level. This is because the SAT, with a staff of only 850,
constitutes a tiny portion (just over 0.1%) of total workforce of
Chinese tax administration. As can be expected, the SAT undertakes
very little direct administrative responsibility viz-a-viz taxpayers.
According to a recent OECD study, 86 which covered 35 OECD
countries and 17 non-OECD countries/regions and which specifically
examined “office networks for revenue bodies,” in 2011, China had
the smallest percentage of tax administration staff working at
headquarters (i.e. national) offices among the 52 countries surveyed.
Further, if provincial tax bureaus are counted as a form of regional
offices, China’s percentage of tax administrators working at either
national or regional offices is still the lowest among all countries
surveyed. Therefore, China is an extreme when compared to other
countries in how “light” its tax administration is at the top.
86

OECD, Tax Administration 2013: Comparative Information on OECD and
Other Advanced and Emerging Economies (Paris: OECD Publishing 2013), p 83.
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The OECD does not further break down tiers of administration
among local/branch offices for China or any other country. 87
However, data compiled by the SAT (for the years from 1995 to
2003) allow us to obtain a more fine-grained view of the “bottomheaviness” of Chinese administration. Chart 3 graphically presents
this information by dividing subnational employees of tax agencies
into three tiers: the provincial level, the prefectural level, and the
county level. 88 The chart reveals that despite the dramatic changes in
staff composition (in terms of educations levels and age) in the tax
bureaucracy during the 1990s and 2000s (as shown in Charts 1 and
2), the vertical distribution of tax administrators hardly changed
during the years in question, and remained very bottom-heavy. For
example, in 2003, provincial-level employees accounted for only 5%
of the staff in the STB system; prefectural level employees accounted
for 16%, and those at the county level or below represented an
overwhelming 79.5%. Because the most important internal
reorganizations of tax agencies were completed before 2003, it is
likely that the distribution of staff up and down the hierarchy is
similar today.

If one were to visualize Chinese tax administration in a
pyramidal figure, divided into 5 tiers (corresponding to the national,
provincial, prefectural, county, and township-level jurisdictions),
then the proportions of areas of the tiers from the top to the bottom

87

In many countries, for example those in Europe, such a further breakdown
would not make sense: a local (as opposed to a regional or national) office is
already at a municipal level that is much smaller in both geographical and
population size than a Chinese county.
88
The chart presents data for the STB system. Patterns for LTBs are similar.
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would have the ratio of 0.1:4.9:15:40:40. 89 The top tier, the nationallevel SAT, would almost be invisible.
Having established the character and extent of decentralization
in Chinese tax administration, I now turn to the analysis of how
decentralization may have contributed to the failures of tax
administrative reform in China since 1997. It is fairly straightforward
to demonstrate the incompatibility of decentralization with certain
important administrative techniques: I have already alluded to the
difficulty of setting up specialized subdivisions within low-level
administrative units, and I will discuss similar difficulties created by
decentralization for techniques such as large taxpayer management
and the use of advance rulings. 90 But the focus in the next Part is the
more fundamental impact of decentralization on taxpayer compliance
options, particularly on how non-rule-based collection practices may
emerge. This analysis is more fundamental for two reasons. First,
unlike traditional discussions of tax administration techniques, which
assume the rule of law or at least the awareness of rules by tax
collectors or taxpayers (whether they enforce or follow such rules or
not), I precisely do not take rule-awareness for granted. Second and
relatedly, tax administration is not a unilateral activity on the part of
the government. The interactions between taxpayers and tax
administrators determine both behavior and the perception of
behavior, and such perception may have a major impact on how
people interpret the needs of administration. For example, as
discussed below, within non-rule-based collection practices, the line
between compliance and non-compliance could be blurred, which
would make it difficult to define what “risk-based” administration
is. 91 This is why I give greater emphasis to the basic incentives
underlying compliance decisions.

89

The figure takes into account the fact that as many as 40% of STB
employees that would be categorized as working at the county level or below in
Chart 3 in fact work below the county level. And in the LTB system, employment
at outpost units represented a dominant 40% of total LTB employment. This means
that well over half of the LTB staff engaged in routine tax administration is
employed at a level below the county. Putting the STB and LTB systems together,
then, approximately half of the employees that are counted as county-level staff
work in outposts below the county level.
90
See Part III.A. infra on large taxpayer management; and text
accompanying notes 123-6 infra on advanced rulings.
91
Thus without changing the organizational pattern responsible for the
emergence of such dynamics, there is no “technical” way of implementing riskbased administration.
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DECENTRALIZATION AND TRANSACTIONAL COSTS IN IMPLEMENTING
THE LAW
This Part argues that administrative decentralization has likely
led to the persistence of non-rule-based tax collection practices in
China. The arguments draw on a strand of scholarship in the
economic analysis of law that identifies various transaction costs
involved in the adoption and implementation of law. 92 Louis
Kaplow, 93 for example, has described the costs of specifying the
content of law to be applied in the future (promulgation costs), the
costs for regulated subjects to inform themselves of the likely
application of law to particular cases (labeled “advisory costs”
below), and the costs for determining the correct application of law
to a particular case in an enforcement action or legal dispute
(enforcement costs). 94 The analysis in this Part is inspired by this
approach, but introduces certain important refinements to it, so as to
shed light on the consequences of administrative decentralization.
Specifically, the following analysis improves the classification of
transactional costs by defining the concept of the communication
costs of law, and advances existing discussions of the structure of
advisory costs by introducing the possibility for regulated subjects to
consult government officials about the content of law, as an
alternative to learning about the law either by themselves or
engaging legal advisors. Moreover, I will show that communication
costs and advisory costs may affect compliance both independently
and in interaction with each other.
A.

Decentralization Increases Costs of Communicating Law

I define the “communication costs” in the implementation of law
as the costs of making relevant parties aware of the content of law as
it may apply to a general class (or classes) of circumstances. For
example, the communication costs associated with a newly adopted
tax regulation include the cost of publicizing the regulation so that
92

See Louis Kaplow, “General Characteristics of Rules” in Boudewijn
Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000), Volume V and the literature cited therein.
93
Louis Kaplow, “Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis” (1992)
42 Duke Law Journal 557.
94
Kaplow evaluates, in terms of these costs, the relative efficiency of
adopting rules as opposed to standards in various circumstances.

Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance

28

knowledge of it may be acquired by taxpayers, tax advisors, and tax
administrators. It also includes the costs these groups of individuals
incur in actually acquiring such knowledge, through various kinds of
training, so that they may be aware of the types of circumstances to
which the regulation may apply. To a large extent, communication
costs are incurred by or for the benefit of legal professionals, whether
they are in the government, in law or other professional service
firms, or non-legal businesses. These professionals have an interest
in acquiring knowledge about what the law says independently of
specific transactions: possessing such knowledge is what makes them
professionals, and the cost of acquiring such knowledge is a type of
fixed cost for being in the profession. By contrast, many regulated
subjects have no incentive to acquire general knowledge about the
law independently of the specific transactions they enter into. For
instance, most taxpayers have no reason to learn about the tax law
beyond the few rules that affect their ordinary activities.
Communication costs as defined above differ from the cost of
legislation (or “promulgation costs”) as modeled by Kaplow: they
are incurred after either a legal rule or a standard is adopted. They
can also be distinguished from the advisory costs incurred by various
parties—government officials, advisors, and regulated subjects—in
informing themselves of the law applicable to a particular proposed
transaction. One can think of this latter type of cost as a form of
marginal, as opposed to fixed, cost. For example, taxpayers may
need to incur such marginal costs for a transaction under
consideration by consulting a tax advisor. In contrast, for the tax
advisor, besides the cost of learning about taxpayer’s circumstances,
it may be that no marginal cost need to be incurred for knowing the
applicable law—the advisor may already have acquired the
knowledge, as a matter of fixed professional investment. 95 Finally, it
should be clear that communications costs is distinct from
enforcement costs, which, like advisory costs, are triggered by
particular transactions.
To see the connection between decentralization and
communication costs, start by noting the importance of specialization
among individuals entrusted with applying law. Specialization
facilitates learning. A specialized tax administrator, for example, will
95

Of course, what each person knows always comprises to a greater or lesser
extent what one has specifically dealt with in the past. But for professionals, we
typically expect that their expertise is partially based on making ongoing fixed-cost
investments in acquiring knowledge about the law.
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more easily learn new rules in his area than someone who does not
specialize. When tax agencies are internally specialized, the cost of
communicating any new law to a particular agency (so that it will
begin to enforce such law) should be lower than agencies that are not
internally specialized. Effective training, for example, may be harder
and more costly for the latter. If decentralization impedes
specialization, then, ceteris paribus, it increases communication cost.
One reason why decentralization impedes specialization is that it
reduces the volume of a given class of transactions that falls within
the jurisdiction of any agency. As a result, most agencies may not be
justified to assign staff to specialize in the law that applies to such
transactions. For example, for most localities in China, it is difficult
to envision international tax specialists operating at a county-level
tax bureau, let alone a sub-county-level outpost. There simply
wouldn’t be sufficient amounts of international transactions arising
in these jurisdictions. Accordingly, most local tax administrators
would have very low incentives to learn about international taxation.
The natural course to take in response to this would be to centralize
international tax administration to higher-level agencies, with
possible exceptions for local jurisdictions where cross-border
transactions are frequent (e.g. counties where foreign direct
investments are concentrated). As we saw in the last Part, the
structure of Chinese tax agencies currently preclude this possibility.
Examples analogous to international tax rules also include those
rules that are particularly relevant to large businesses, corporate
headquarters, and transactions among businesses across domestic
jurisdictions. It is obvious that most local tax administrators would
have insufficient incentives to specialize in these rules, since the
relevant taxpayers and transactions tend to be geographically
concentrated. However, if this were the only way in which
decentralized administration increases communication costs, the
significance of decentralization for compliance would be secondary.
This is because international or large businesses are reasonably likely
to adequately inform themselves of the content of law and to display
a reasonable degree of basic compliance (even while pursuing a wide
variety of legal, tax, and regulatory maneuvers and arbitrage). If
taxpayers tend to be compliant in sectors that require administrative
specialization, the lack of such specialization may generate problems
for taxpayer service, but possibly not for the level of compliance
itself.
It is thus important to recognize other ways in which
decentralization may increase the cost of communicating law to law
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enforcers. One is the effect on career incentives. Decentralization of
the Chinese variety implies a very steep administrative hierarchy.
Most government employees starting at the bottom of the hierarchy,
in the townships and counties, cannot expect to rise very high. Thus
neither monetary compensation nor career prospects encourage lowlevel government employees to invest a great deal in professional
development. 96 Another is the cost of transmitting information
through a chain that has too many links. For example, until fairly
recently, the SAT, like many other national agencies, issued informal
guidance on law and policy—which comprises much of the
substance of what is known as Chinese tax law 97—that are
transmitted layer-by-layer, from provincial to prefecture to county
tax bureaus, and eventually to the branch bureaus and tax offices.
According to government officials, not infrequently, a rule would fail
to be enforced in some jurisdictions simply because some
intermediate office did not pass it on to subsidiary agencies. A 2010
SAT initiative aimed at promoting transparency in rulemaking,
requiring that all guidance intended to be binding on taxpayers and
other regulated subjects be published, has mitigated this problem. 98
But it is already remarkable that it took a government transparency
project to solve this internal bureaucratic problem. Moreover, this
pattern of layered transmission of information still characterizes
other aspects of the communication of the law, for example the
training of tax officials. 99
Overall, then, decentralizing government regulatory functions to
the bottom of a steep administrative hierarchy increases the cost for
government officials to learn the law. This effect applies to both
higher- and lower-level officials: because the former are not directly
engaged with regulatory activities, they may not have sufficient firsthand experience or incentive to learn the law in detail (or reinforce
what was once learned). Note that this is not a problem of principals
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Despite low turnover in tax agencies (see Chart 2 supra), Chinese
commentaries on tax administration mention low incentives and lack of interest on
the part of employees with some frequency.
97
Wei Cui, “What Is the ‘Law’ in Chinese Tax Administration?” (2011)
Asia Pacific Law Review 19(1), pp 75-94
98
Id.
99
For example, the SAT would sponsor training sessions targeted at
provincial tax administrators; provinces would convene training for lower-level
agencies, and such lower agencies for their subsidiary agencies. The reliability of
the content of much low-level training therefore very much depends on the level of
knowledge and incentives of the trainees of the higher-level training sessions.
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properly monitoring agents, of making sure that lower-level officials
implement the law. It is a problem of communication. In itself, the
problem may be significant only in certain policy areas where
regulatory complexity favors centralization (e.g. tax rules relating to
large or international businesses). However, in interaction with other
effects of decentralization, high communication costs can undermine
compliance for a larger population of regulated subjects.
B. Decentralization and the Structure of Advisory Costs

Let us now examine how decentralization within a regulatory
bureaucracy may affect the costs for regulated subjects to inform
themselves of the content of law, and thereby their decisions
regarding whether to seek such information. To do this, consider a
simple framework for thinking about taxpayer choice. 100 Suppose
that a taxpayer, when contemplating entering into a particular
transaction, is uncertain about the content of tax law applicable to the
proposed transaction. He has three choices about how to determine
the relevant content of law:
(A) He may engage in self-study (e.g. by consulting government
publications), acquire professional tax advice, or inquire
with taxpayer service units within the tax administration if
taxpayer inquiries are routinely answered by such units;
(B) Alternatively, he may make a mere guess about the content
of law, including the likelihood of detection of noncompliance and applicable penalties;
(C) Finally, he may be able to consult with the tax
collector/administrator whom he deals with during routine
(e.g. weekly or monthly) tax compliance, regarding the tax
collector’s view about how the transaction should be treated.
In many countries, (A) and (B) are the only choices that a
taxpayer has available. Only a small set of taxpayers, e.g. large
corporations where audit teams from the tax agency are routinely
stationed, have tax administration staff specifically assigned to them

100

The framework set out here may be compared with related models in
Kaplow, supra note 93, and in Yehonatan Givati, “Resolving Legal Uncertainty:
The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax Rulings” (2009) 29 Virginia Tax Review
137. See note 112 infra for a brief comparison with Kaplow’s model; and notes
121-2 infra and accompanying text for some discussion of Givati’s model.
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and deal with them on a routine basis. Taxpayers may have access to
good taxpayer services, including having simple inquiries answered,
but the government staff answering the inquiries are not the ones that
will engage in audits and make tax assessments for the inquiring
taxpayers. However, in a decentralized tax administration, where
most tax officials are at the lowest level and their primary task is to
monitor a specific set of taxpayers, (C) becomes an option for
taxpayers.
One may conjecture that choices (A), (B) and (C) are associated
with different outcomes in terms of compliance with tax law. This is
for two distinct reasons. First, different pre-dispositions for
compliance may be associated with the three choices. A taxpayer
who chooses option (A) is more likely to comply with the law than
one that chooses option (B). This is more likely to be true when the
content of law is more uncertain, and the amount of potential tax
liability (and of penalties for non-compliance) is greater: it is hard to
imagine a taxpayer who faces high risks of significant negative
consequences without trying to find out more about such
consequences, unless he believes that he can get away without
suffering such negative consequences. The intrinsic compliance
potential of a taxpayer who chooses (only) 101 option (C) is more
interesting. On the one hand, he is not someone who simply
disregards the law, failing to inform himself of the content of law
even when there is uncertainty. On the other hand, if he regards the
views of specific low-level tax officials as the only information about
law that is relevant, his compliance decisions may be more narrowly
based on judgments about the capacity of these particular officials to
detect and penalize non-compliance. This suggests that, all other
things equal, the taxpayer is likely to be more non-compliant than a
taxpayer who chooses option (A).
The second reason why choices (A), (B) and (C) may produce
different compliance outcomes has to do with the nature of the
advice the taxpayer receives. Under option (B), the taxpayer receives
no advice and merely makes an uninformed guess. Under option (A),
the taxpayer receives advice, which we will assume is generally
accurate. Both independently and in combination with the predisposition to comply on the part of taxpayers who choose (A), this
means that a taxpayer is much more likely to act in a compliant
manner when choosing (A) rather than (B). The choice of (C) is
101

Later on, we discuss the case where a taxpayer’s chooses to pursue both
options (A) and (C).
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again interesting. It was argued earlier that where decentralization
significantly increases the communication costs of law, the
likelihood that a tax collector does not know the law increases.
Specifically, there is a distinct possibility that many tax collectors
know less tax law than independent providers of tax advice. 102 Thus
a taxpayer may receive different advice under choices (A) and (C),
not only because paid tax advisors (and taxpayers themselves) may
be inclined to interpret the law differently from government official,
but also because, interpretive tendencies aside, third-party advisors
and enforcement officials may possess different levels of knowledge
about the law. 103 Because of this, a taxpayer who makes inquiries
only with low-level tax officials (choosing option (C)) may ironically
be less likely to be in compliance with tax law in the end than one
who independently acquires knowledge about the law.
In summary, it may be hypothesized that the even though the
choice of (C) produces more compliance than the choice of (B), the
choice of (A) produces more compliance than both the choices for
(B) and for (C).
How, though, does the taxpayer choose among options (A), (B)
and (C)? We may suppose that all taxpayers aim to minimize the sum
of the following costs: (i) the expected tax payments associated with
a specific proposed transaction, 104 (ii) the expected cost of penalties
associated with under-payment of tax for the transaction, and (iii) the
advisory costs incurred. Costs of type (i) and (ii) may be relevant
under all three options. Costs of type (iii), however, will be incurred
only under options (A) and (C). Thus if the expected costs of types
(i) and (ii) are sufficiently low, no advice of any type may be sought
(resulting in the choice of (B)).
Turning to the choice between (A) and (C), the cost (“Co”) of
consulting a local, low-level tax official “in charge” of the taxpayer
under option (C) may either be higher or lower than the cost (“Ca"”)
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As discussed in Part IV.A infra, there is an endogenous relationship
between the taxpayer’s choice among (A), (B) and (C) and the availability of
advice under option (A).
103
Even in well-functioning tax administrative systems, government officials
may be more prone to errors at least relative to some tax advisors (if not in
comparison to the average tax advisor). For example, tax agencies may be understaffed, and civil servants may be insufficiently paid, or insufficiently informed
about the nature of market transactions compared to tax advisors. But the
discrepancy may be small and tolerable.
104
The taxpayer may learn, under either option (A) or (C), that the expected
tax payment is so high that it would not make sense to pursue the transaction.

Administrative Decentralization and Tax Compliance

34

of consulting a knowledgeable third-party advisor under option (A).
In many countries, for most taxpayers and transactions, consulting a
tax administrator in advance about the tax treatment of a transaction
may be difficult, whereas a market for tax advisors readily exists. In
such situations, Co > Ca. 105 In a decentralized system where tax
administrators are assigned to supervise specific taxpayers, however,
Co may be lower, sometimes significantly, than engaging a thirdparty advisor. 106 In such a case, the taxpayer would choose option
(A) only if the advice it receives can lower the sum of costs of type
(i) and (ii) sufficiently to cover the cost differential between Co and
Ca. 107
Conversely, it also follows that a taxpayer is unlikely to choose
option (A) and independently acquire knowledge about the tax law
if, on average, choosing option (C) and inquiring with the “in
charge” tax authority does not generally result in greater aggregate
costs of types (i) and (ii). 108 This condition may be satisfied because
of numerous features of a decentralized tax administration that in
themselves do not have to do with transactions costs. For example,
when there are many decentralized tax collection agents, internal
bureaucratic monitoring of their performance in terms of adherence
to legal rules may be difficult. Instead, revenue collection targets
may be adopted. If these targets are set either roughly at or below the
level of revenue that would be collected if the law were faithfully
applied, then, again, the decisions of tax collectors about how
specific transactions are to be treated are likely to be advantageous,
or at least not disadvantageous, to taxpayers who follow these
decisions instead of law. 109 Moreover, where tax administration is
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While advance rulings are well known in developed countries, the range
of issues for which they are available tends to be limited. Advance rulings are also
not systematically available in many other countries.
106
For example, the only professional tax advisors available may be those
serving high-compliance clients and who charge high fees.
107
A knowledgeable tax advisor may recommend legal means for lowering
taxes. The expected cost of penalties can also depend on whether one receives
professional advice.
108
In other words, it must be the case that one does not always get
“unfavorable” answers by talking to tax administrators. If tax officials tend to
arrive at the same conclusions about applicable tax law as independent tax
advisors, then taxpayers should choose (C) over (A), if Co < Ca.
109
If these targets are set too much above the level of revenue that the law
dictates, on the other hand, appealing to the law may be of no use: the tax collector
may still insist on extracting payments from taxpayers regardless of whether there
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perceived to be weak, statutory tax rules may be written—with
higher tax rates, broader tax bases, and more types of taxes on
identical transactions—so as to reflect significant “expected slack” in
enforcement. Again in such situations, it may not be advantageous
for the taxpayer to follow the rules of law. 110
Whether decentralized tax administration, the adoption of
revenue targets as primary measures of tax agency performance, and
the design of statutory rules specifically to take into account
enforcement “slack” are mutually correlated is an important question
deserving separate investigation. Each of the latter two may have
adverse effects on the rule of law and the implementation of tax
policy, but for the purpose of the analysis here, the crucial point is
that relying on the views of a tax collector as opposed to an
independent tax advisor may not be associated with greater expected
aggregate tax payment and penalties.
The upshot of the foregoing analysis is that, where (C) is an
available option for taxpayers, 111 there is a significant likelihood for
taxpayers to pursue the option instead of option (A), in order to
minimize advisory costs. The taxpayer and the tax collector may
agree to a tax treatment—the former anticipating the treatment and
latter endorsing such an anticipation—both in ignorance of (or a state
of uncertainty about) the actual content of the law. Because of this,
there is a greater likelihood that the subsequent conduct (e.g. tax
payment after the implementation of the transaction) is not in accord
with the actual requirement of law. 112 Taxpayers may also use the

is ground for doing so in the law. Or, if the taxpayer resists, the tax agency may
seek other means to make up for the revenue shortfall.
110
In such circumstances, some taxpayers may choose not to acquire
knowledge about such rules, i.e. option (B) is superior to option (A).
111
That is, Co is lowered to a level below Ca. Institutional arrangements (b)(d) also imply that option (C) may be superior to option (A) even if Co > Ca.
112
Kaplow, supra note 93, analyzes the choice of an individual about
whether to acquire information about the liability law applicable to a potentially
harm-causing activity that the individual might pursue. The individual will decide
to acquire information only if advisory cost is outweighed by savings in expected
liability costs (net of the cost of care). The advisory cost may depend on whether
the applicable law assumes the form of a rule or a standard. Because advisory costs
are cheaper when a rule is available, some individuals might acquire information
when a rule is available but not when only a standard is available. For these
individuals, whether a rule or standard was adopted may lead to different behavior
that is in greater or lesser conformity with the underlying norms of law, depending
on the form of the law.
Taxpayer choices within our framework can be analogized to the choices of
Kaplow’s individuals, i.e. those who choose (B) are analogous to those in
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combination of (A) and (C) to achieve a superior outcome than the
choice of (A) alone permits. In this case, ignorance about the law is
one-sided, but the result is again non-compliance with the law.
This framework reveals several interesting features that may
characterize non-rule-based tax collection. First, even when a
taxpayer has acted differently from what the law requires (e.g. made
an underpayment of tax), the taxpayer is in one sense not noncompliant. It may instead be said to be “semi-compliant”, insofar as
its actions are blessed by the tax administrator’s (non-binding)
advice. Second, although taxpayers predisposed to non-compliance
are more likely to choose option (C) over option (A), compliant
taxpayers may also choose option (C) in balancing the expected costs
and benefits of obtaining knowledge about the law. That is, semicompliant behavior blurs the distinction between more and less
compliant taxpayers.
Third, the resulting tax collection is non-rule-based in the sense
that the tax liability is determined under incomplete information
about the law. This is distinguishable from presumptive taxation, a
practice that has received more attention in the existing literature. 113
Presumptive taxation is a matter of determining tax liability when
there is incomplete information about the true tax base relating to a
taxpayer’s businesses and transactions. It can be, and is generally
recommended to be, rule-based: the factors that determine
presumptive tax liabilities—even though they differ from normal
rules for determining tax liabilities—are supposed to be set out in
rules. By contrast, in the type of taxpayer-official interaction
described here, even if the taxpayer is capable of keeping relevant
records and willing to disclose relevant information, such records
and information may not be assembled and transmitted to tax

Kaplow’s model who do not acquire information about the law regardless of
whether a rule or a standard is adopted; those who choose (A) to those in Kaplow’s
model who acquire information regardless of the form of the law. However, in our
framework, the choice that leads to less compliance ((C)) may be the cheaper one
from an advisory cost perspective. More importantly, under Kaplow’s model, the
existence of individuals who acquire information only when there is a rule but not
when there is a standard is merely a logical possibility. Under our framework, by
contrast, information can be introduced to predict how often taxpayers will choose
to consult “in charge” tax officials instead of independently acquiring information
about the law. Under a wide range of scenarios, such behavior may be quite likely.
113
See Victor Thuronyi, “Presumptive Taxation,” Chapter 12 in Thuronyi,
ed., Tax Law Design and Drafting 1 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996).
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agencies—due to ignorance about the applicable law. As a result,
information is simply forfeited.
Fourth, although mutual understandings in deviation from the
law may be reached regarding tax liabilities, there may be no
corruption or any seriously unscrupulous dealing involved. From a
tax administrator’s perspective, reasons for agreeing to enter into the
type of interaction under option (C) might include (i) the desire to
gather factual information and ensure revenue collection, (ii)
possibly to enhance one’s turf/power and (iii) to create opportunities
for rent-seeking. To be weighed against these are the fact that such
informal interactions (iv) increase the tax administrator’s workload,
and (v) reduce the deterrence effect of penalties. The corrupt motive
((iii)) need not be dominant. Often, both the tax administrator and the
taxpayer may be accused at most of benign negligence.
In fact, because the type of non-rule-based tax collection
depicted above is essentially continuous with rule-based tax
collection and compliant behavior, and because the motives involved
in the taxpayer-official interactions are benign, one can imagine such
behavior and practices to happen on a massive scale. But where they
are prevalent, the law ceases to be relevant beyond the boundaries of
specific tax administrator’s knowledge about the law. Compliance
ceases to be rule-governed, and tax policy—or at least the finer
points of it—cease to be implemented.
Because such phenomenon is conceptually continuous with
compliant behavior and rule-based tax collection, its prevalence is
hard to measure. 114 Fortunately, the phenomenon implies a number
of observable and distinct outcomes. 115 The next Part discusses two
of such outcomes, namely the under-development of a tax advisory
profession and the low level of observed legal disputes between
taxpayers and tax agencies. These two phenomena are of course
important in themselves for the operation of tax administration. But
if they can be further traced to administrative decentralization—
which, in the absence of the framework developed here, would not
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While the description of the phenomenon may strike those familiar with
daily tax compliance in China as accurate, one might be wary of mere anecdotal
evidence. Even such anecdotal evidence tells us something, however, assuming
that the phenomenon depicted is unfamiliar to taxpayer and tax administrators in
developed countries with mature tax systems.
115
The framework developed in this part can be verified, for example, by
sociological surveys of what taxpayers and tax administrators actually do. Such
investigation, to the author’s knowledge, has not been attempted by anyone.
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be obvious at all—the explanatory power of the framework would be
quite significant.
IV.
INDIRECT EVIDENCE OF NON-RULE-BASED TAX COLLECTION
In the early 1990s, when Chinese national policymakers drew
the blueprints for a brand-new system of tax administration, their
vision identified, with what seems to be remarkable learnedness, two
interesting components of administrative reform. One was the
promotion of taxpayer representation, with accountants, lawyers, and
other “social intermediary organizations” assisting taxpayers in their
voluntary compliance. The development of a tax profession was
perceived to be the international norm and even said to be an
indispensable link in tax administration. 116 The thinking behind this
view presumably was that given that China would be promulgating
many new tax law and regulations, if a large workforce in a large
economy was going to be induced to engage in voluntary tax
compliance, and if government resources were going to be limited,
the assistance of professionals would be needed. The other
component was formal dispute resolution between taxpayers and tax
agencies, through both an administrative appeal system and judicial
processes. 117 Both these two components, however, have failed to
achieve the significance predicted of them.
A. Under-Development of the Tax Profession

As to taxpayer representation, 20 years later, the Chinese tax
profession is widely regarded as under-developed. Law firms in
China—whether domestic or international, and from the high to the
low ends of the market—generally do not practice tax law, whether
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The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and Commercial
Tax System, supra note 63, Section 6.2. The importance of tax service providers
continued to be emphasized by the government throughout different phases of tax
administration reform. See Guobanfa [1997] 1, supra note 63, Section 2(2)(ii);
Plan for Further Deepening Tax Administration Reform, supra note 56, Section
2(2)(iv).
117
The Implementation Plan for Reforming the Industrial and Commercial
Tax System, supra note 63 (reform expected to bring about a “new configuration
in tax administration where lawmaking, tax collection, tax inspection, and
administrative review and litigation form four equally important, coordinated but
mutually constraining functions”).
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in transactional or litigation practices (the latter is not surprising,
given the low volume of tax litigation discussed below). While the
accounting profession is more active in providing tax services, and
while certification as a registered accountant requires examinations
that include tax as one of the subjects, the market for tax compliance
and advisory services provided by accountants is highly segmented.
Major international accounting firms serve almost exclusively
multinational clients, and the high fees they charge reinforce market
segregation—few domestic clients are willing to pay. Domestic
accounting firms have generally remained small and localized. The
tax services offered by such firms appear to be limited: tax
compliance is usually done in-house, and then usually within an
accounting department rather than a separate tax department. Even in
commercial centers like Beijing and Shanghai, tax sections in bar
and accounting associations are inactive. 118
There is actually a third profession providing tax services in
China. The profession of certified tax agents (CTAs) was specifically
created and supported by the Chinese government and is supervised
by the SAT. Given their government backing, and given the low
market shares of lawyers and accountants in domestic tax services,
one might expect CTAs to have prospered. In reality, although there
are CTA firms all over China (many of which absorbed retirees from
local tax agencies), they barely make money and struggle to justify
their own existence. Throughout the past decade, CTAs continuously
lobbied the SAT to mandate certain tax services and grant them
monopolies in providing such services. To its credit, the government
has so far declined to do so. The desperation of CTAs testifies to the
low domestic demand for professional tax services.
Yet this is precisely what the analysis of semi-compliant
behavior and non-rule-based tax collection offered in Part III would
predict. The wide availability of the option of consulting tax officials
directly about the appropriate treatment of proposed transactions
reduces the population of taxpayers choosing consultation with thirdparty advisors, and thereby reduces the size of the market for tax
advice. The only remaining tax advisors are those who serve clients
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The main manifestation of professional activity in the tax area is now
online: as both commercial transactions and Chinese tax law and regulations
become more complex, the internet has seen a growing number of active forums
for the discussion of tax law. However, professionals tend to participate in such
forums as individuals without advertising their businesses (if they had any). They
also generally do not gather in person.
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who choose the costlier ways of learn about the law (option (A)).
Such advisors are likely to have invested in training in tax law to a
much greater extent than most enforcement officials. This in turn
increases the likelihood of different advice come from the two
different types of sources of legal information.
Indeed, decentralization producing inadequately informed
enforcement officials may also be perceived by some taxpayers to
decrease the utility of third-party tax advice: tax advisors can only
tell them what the appropriate tax treatment should be; they cannot
reliably predict what the tax treatment will actually end up being:
that result is generally determined by the low-level officials in the
“taxpayer management” system described in Part II.A. As a result,
the practice of informal consultation with government officials
reduces the demand for professional services even from potential
clients who are able to pay for such services. In recent years, even
the most powerful and lucrative international accounting firms have
struggled with the question: What does it mean to provide Chinese
tax advice? Is it to interpret the law, or is it instead to find out
government officials’ interpretation of law? And if the answer is the
latter, which government officials’ views are relevant? The
uncomfortable truth is that when the law is not what provides
guidance, individual outcomes are determined by the views of
individual government employees populating the bottom of the
bureaucratic hierarchy. It is difficult even for very large professional
firms to gather information about the views and attitudes of most
individuals in this large population.
The predicament of Chinese tax advisors can be illustrated by
one administrative practice. To tax specialists in mature tax systems,
option (C) discussed in Section III.B may bring to mind the practice
of obtaining advance rulings, in which tax advisors in developed
countries play important roles. 119 But significant differences exist
between taxpayers consulting low-level tax officials informally about
proposed transactions and advance ruling “systems” as commonly
conceived. As has been argued in connection with the application for
private letter rulings (PLRs) in the U.S., 120 the key benefits of
advance rulings include reducing legal uncertainty and the
prevention of high penalties if taxpayer’s position turns out to be
119

Rulings are favored by many tax advisors because they not only earn fees
from preparing for a ruling application, but also reduce their own risk by
substituting rulings for professional opinions issued to clients.
120
Givati, supra note 100.
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wrong. Certainty and mitigation of potential penalties are also
possible incentives for taxpayers to initiate the type of interaction
with tax administrators captured under option (C) in our analysis.
However, any certainty obtained tends to have nothing to do with the
law. 121 If any certainty is created by such interactions, it is only
because the same officials expressing their views now may be in
charge of examining (if any examination happens) the transaction in
question in the future. That is, the official’s view now may be a
relevant predictor of his view in the future. Nonetheless, this type of
“cheap ruling” has some reliance value: although the taxpayer has no
legal ground for relying on the official’s pronouncement, the official
may still feel bound to a large extent by his own pronouncements.
Moreover, the likelihood of severe penalties is also reduced. 122
Obviously, it is difficult for professional advisors to insert
themselves into this kind of taxpayer-government interaction and
charge fees for services. Conversely, the type of ruling system for
which advisors can charge fees for is difficult to set up in a
decentralized system. Reflecting the fact of decentralization, China’s
Law on the Administration of Tax Collection generally gives tax
agencies at different levels concurrent jurisdiction over matters
relating to particular taxpayers. 123 This means that a private ruling
issued by the SAT (or by a provincial or any other superior tax
bureaus) may not be legally binding on a lower-level bureau. Even
though the national or provincial tax agency is bureaucratically
superior, if a lower-level agency disagrees with the legal

121

The low-level tax administrators contacted are unlikely to be authorized
to issue binding decisions in any way. Their bureaucratic superiors, colleagues
who subsequently take over their positions, or even they themselves are all free
legally to adopt different views about the relevant tax treatment in the future.
Indeed they may be at greater liberty to change their views than independent tax
advisors.
122
It is worth noting that taxpayers in our framework do not face some of the
considerations that, according to Givati (id.), discourage U.S. taxpayers from
seeking PLRs. For example, Givati suggests that the application for a ruling may
significantly increase the probability of inspection and of detection of a
controversial issue. In contrast, if sufficiently many taxpayers make inquiries about
the basic content of law without having independently informed themselves of the
law, each inquiry may not significantly raise the probability of audit or detection
for the transaction that the inquiry relates to.
123
Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993)
Article 14 (all references to “tax agencies” in the statute are to tax bureaus and
branches at different levels).
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interpretation adopted in the superior-agency ruling, it is legally
entitled to disregard the ruling. 124 The SAT has indirectly
acknowledged this phenomenon: its guidance on the procedures for
the issuance of private rulings stipulates that the request for a ruling
should normally be submitted to the (local) tax agency in charge of
the taxpayer, even if only a higher office has the power to resolve the
legal issue raised. 125 The ruling request would then be forwarded up
the bureaucratic ranks for resolution. In cases where the applicant
sidesteps the local tax agency, the ruling request must be brought
back to the local tax agency for investigation, regarding which the
local agency may suggest the appropriate treatment. The guidance
thus rather explicitly discourages taxpayers from seeking shortcuts in
the administrative hierarchy, in order to reduce potential internal
discord with lower-level agencies. This, however, significantly raises
the cost of the ruling process, and dilutes the value of the tax
advisors’ access to government officials at the SAT level.
B. Low Volume of Formal Dispute Resolution

Scholars studying Chinese tax law or administrative law 126 have
puzzled over the low volume of litigation against tax agencies in
recent years. All across China, only about 400 lawsuits per year are
brought against tax agencies each year, and tax litigation currently
comprises less than 0.3% of all administrative law suits brought
against government agencies. Despite the fact that tax agencies
employ more than 10% of China’s civil servant, and despite the
presumed importance of taxation in the lives of citizens and the
businesses they operate, tax had remained one of the less litigious
areas of government. This suggests that whatever general
institutional factors have suppressed citizens’ willingness to

124

See, e.g. Shenzhen Energy Group Ltd. v Inspection Bureau of the
Qinzhou Local Tax Bureau (Guixingzhongzi (2002) 30, Higher People's Court of
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, date of decision in 2002 unclear)
(describing local tax agency’s non-compliance with an SAT ruling)
125
SAT, (Trial) Work Protocols for Replies Regarding Specific Tax Matters
(Guoshuifa [2012] 14, February 10, 2012), Art. 8.
126
He Haibo, “The Wearied State of Administrative Litigation” (2012)
Journal of the Eastern University of Political Science and Law, 2012:2; Ji Li,
“Dare You Sue the Tax Collectors? An Empirical Study of Tax-Related
Administrative Lawsuits in China” (2014) 23 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 57.
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challenge government actions in Chinese courts, 127 factors special to
tax administration may be at play.
Existing studies have been rather quick in endorsing some
obviously unreflective explanations of the low volume of tax
litigation. The general lack of independence of the Chinese judiciary
is often offered as the first culprit, 128 and purported low win rates for
plaintiffs are sometimes cited as evidence of this familiar
proposition. This explanation, however, ignores arguments and
evidence that Chinese courts have generally displayed growing
independence, especially in areas that are not regarded as politically
sensitive, 129 as well as evidence that the “government gorilla” tends
to “come out ahead” 130 even in judicial systems that are generally
regarded as independent. Another unreflective explanation of the low
level of tax litigation is that taxpayers fear retaliation. 131 From a
comparative perspective, this explanation is certainly unusual:
probably no one, including those in government, likes being sued,
but why should we assume that Chinese tax agencies are aggravated
by lawsuits to a worse degree, and are likely to be more vindictive,
than other Chinese government agencies or than tax agencies in other
countries? 132
127

Jinhua Cheng, “Institutional Options for the Settlement of Administrative
Disputes in China: From the Perspective of Public Demand” (2010) Social
Sciences in China 31(3) 5-26
128
Li, supra note 127. For a general discussion of existing explanations of
the low level of tax litigation in China, see Wei Cui, “Understanding Tax
Litigation in China: A Systematic Content Analysis of Published Case Law”
(2014) paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and
Economics Association, Toronto, September 20, 2014.
129
Yulin Fu and Randall Peerenboom, “A New Analytical Framework for
Understanding and Promoting Judicial Independence in China”, in Randall
Peerenboom ed, Judicial Independence In China: Lessons For Global Rule Of Law
Promotion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
130
Herbert Kritzer, “The Government Gorilla”, in H. Kritzer and S. Silbey
ed, In Litigation: Do The “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead? (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003), 342-371.
131
Li, supra note 127.
132
Retaliatory actions, if themselves in deviation from the law, presumably
may also be challenged in court. The fear-of-retaliation explanation of the low
volume of tax litigation thus implies an unexplained sphere within which tax
administrators have unchecked discretion, and in which they can easily impose
unwanted costs on “disobedient” taxpayers. Since the rule of law is supposed
precisely to limit or eliminate such spheres of government discretion, the fear-ofretaliation explanation postulates an unexplained sphere in which the rule of law
fails, in order to explain the much more limited phenomenon of most taxpayers
choosing not to litigate.
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If, however, most Chinese taxpayers and tax administrators are
engaged in the type of semi-compliant behavior and non-rule-based
collection practice depicted in Part III, then the low volume of tax
litigation in China has a much more natural explanation. If, in the
compliance game played most of the time, tax liabilities are
determined jointly by taxpayers and tax administrators in a state of
collective ignorance (and under-informedness) about the law, then a
taxpayer deciding to hold tax authorities to the letters of the law is in
an obvious sense reneging on the bargain. Thus it is not necessary
that Chinese tax administrators are more vengeful than others against
citizens who want to uphold their rights under the law; it is sufficient
that the normal equilibrium in tax administration—one which
taxpayers not only are complicit in but even derive advantage from—
is attained in significant deviation from the requirements of law. Part
III explained why such an equilibrium might obtain, as a result of
administrative decentralization.
This alternative explanation of the low volume of tax litigation
in China has two important implications. First, even if the Chinese
judiciary were much more independent than it actually is today,
taxpayers still might not bring lawsuits, if normal tax compliance
continued not to be shaped by the rule of law. In other words, the
rule of law has foundered at a much earlier and fundamental stage
than adjudication, as a result of the level and structure of
transactional costs in the communication and learning of law.
Litigation patterns may be determined more by this more
fundamental failure in the legal system than anything relating to
adjudication mechanisms themselves. Second, since judicial
monitoring of the actions of tax administrators is generally possible
only if taxpayers are willing to challenge tax agencies in court, the
non-rule-based tax collection practice engendered by administrative
decentralization indirectly renders judicial monitoring unlikely. sThis
casts serious doubt on the intuition of some policy advisors that
judicial monitoring is what is needed to make tax administrators
collect tax on the basis of law. 133
V.
EVALUATING AND EXPLAINING NON-RULE-BASED TAX COLLECTION
Part IV described indirect evidence for the type of non-rulebased tax collection practice conceptualized in Part III.B. The
133

See notes 9-10 supra.
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discussion does not presuppose that active tax professions and active
tax litigation are intrinsically good things. Instead, they are only
proxies for how often legal rules are resorted to in tax administration
and compliance.
Knowledge of and compliance with rules is important for
taxation for many reasons. In some areas of law, informal
mechanisms can often serve as adequate substitutes for legal
institutions. For example, community norms may regulate behavior
with respect to property rights without the intervention of property
law; 134 and the desire to maintain one’s reputation may be sufficient
to ensure performance of contractual obligations. 135 In these areas,
the choice of private parties not to learn about the law does not
necessarily result in undesirable social outcomes. But in many areas
of modern government activity, especially the implementation of
modern tax and regulatory policies, social norms are very unlikely to
be adequate substitutes for the law itself. Such policy tends to be
made based on its expected impact on the behavior of large
populations of private subjects (engaged in increasingly specialized
activities), as well as on the distribution of resources among them. 136
It is essential for the implementation of such policies that private
parties learn what the law is. Taxes and regulations thus depend on
the rule of law in a much broader and more basic sense than the
availability of independent judiciaries, constraints on government
actors, etc.
Moreover, many techniques of government administration (in
tax as well as elsewhere) use concepts and categories that implicitly
depend on the law. An example is risk-based tax administration. Are
the semi-compliant taxpayers discussed in Part III.B high- or lowrisk? Insofar as tax agencies may possess little relevant information
about such taxpayers (because the parties do not know what
information the application of appropriate rules requires), and insofar
the taxpayers themselves do not know the relevant law, they cannot
be said to be low-risk. However, this means that the population of
134

See, e.g. Robert Ellickson, “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution
among Neighbors in Shasta County” (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623; Eric Rasmusen
and Richard McAdams, "Norms in Law and Economics", in A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell ed. Handbook of Law and Economics (North Holland, 2007),
Volume 2.
135
Shavell, supra note 20, Section 10.2, Chapter 13.
136
For example, while particular taxpayers (and tax administrators) may care
about only the amount of tax paid, tax policy cares about whether taxes cause
distortions, are sufficiently progressive, etc.
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risky taxpayers will be relatively large, whereas the rationale for
risk-based tax administration is to conserve tax agency resources and
make administration more targeted. In fact, as discussed above, even
taxpayers who are capable of investing in compliance (e.g.
independently investigating the content of law) and therefore should
have been low-risk may either be forced to follow the opinions of
low-level tax administrators (in order to avoid friction) or
strategically choose to consult their opinions. Thus, non-rule-based
tax collection can make compliant taxpayers less compliant, and
render risk-based administration infeasible. 137
It is important to consider now some alternative explanations of
the phenomena described in Parts III and IV. 138 A first alternative
that may be proposed to the analysis in Part III is that the felt need
for making inquiries with local tax officials arises from the fact that
written Chinese tax law is full of holes and ambiguities. This fact
itself implies a great deal of variation in practice among different
regions. Naturally, taxpayers will need to find out what the relevant
local practice is. In other words, if there are no rules to rely on, tax
collection by definition will have to be non-rule-based. 139 Could this
explain such practices in China, without resorting to the fact of
decentralization?
The answer is that, while one might reasonably hold that there
is a short supply of legal rules in China, the impact of
decentralization is distinct. Suppose that tax administrators are not
easily accessible, as they are under decentralized administration.
Then the absence of clear legal rules may be expected to increase
demand for tax advice—tax advisors would be asked to divine what
the applicable legal rule might be. Gaps and ambiguities in the law
may also be expected to increase the quantity of disputes, and some
of that increased quantity should end up in courts. In other words, the
dearth of rules alone should arguably produce a number of
consequences that are in fact not observed. Conversely, as Part III
showed, in the presence of decentralization, even if there are
unambiguously applicable rules, informal practices that neglect such
137

Another example of an essential regulatory device that depends on ruleawareness is self-reporting. See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, “Optimal Law
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior” (1994) 102 J Polit Econ 583, 601–
03.
138
Some of these explanations are also likely accompanied by more positive
evaluations of non-rule-based tax collection than has been so far implied.
139
Put in terms of the analytical framework in Part III.B, option (A) may not
be available.
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rules may still (and do) emerge. Therefore, the state of Chinese tax
law cannot by itself explain non-rule-based collection practices,
although it might be shaped by such practices and by decentralization
itself. 140
An alternative explanation may also be offered for the
phenomena described in Part IV. It might be suggested that the core
of the story told in Part III is that taxpayers have access to tax
collectors in a cheap and informal manner. Once such access is
possible, a variety of things can happen, and Part III depicted only
one possible scenario: namely that, when neither the tax collector nor
the taxpayer bothers to find out about the law (because the cost of
doing so is relatively high), the tax liability they agree to will deviate
randomly from the law (within certain bounds). 141 But a different
imaginable scenario is that both the tax collector and the taxpayer do
know what the relevant legal standard is. However, the legally
required tax liability serves only as a reference point for the two
sides to bargain for a different outcome, which will always be lower
than the legally required tax liability. That is, one can imagine tax
collectors always being willing to offer “discounts” from the tax
liability legally imposed (which is merely the “sticker price”), if the
taxpayer makes a sufficient effort to bargain for it. 142 If such
bargaining is prevalent, then it will also follow as a consequence that
140

For example, the authors of legislation and regulations may be too high
up the administrative hierarchy, and too far away from the reality of tax
administration, to provide timely legal guidance for issues in tax administration.
141
The analysis in Part III.B argued that this option would be rational for the
taxpayer to choose if the resulting tax burden is, on average, not higher than what
would have been required by actual legal standards. It was necessary to make this
condition explicit, if one assumes that tax collectors are interested in maximizing
revenue collection, and that legal standards often serve as a meaningful constraint
on the tax collector’s effort to maximize revenue. In other words, I assumed that
neglecting legal standards could mean foregoing this form of constraint on tax
collectors.
142
It may be further suggested that this type of systematic discounting of
stated (and well-known) legal obligations happens in more rule-based settings as
well, as evidenced, for example, by many developed countries’ persistent tolerance
for tax avoidance activities. Different explanations for such discounting may be
offered. For example, some argue that legal loopholes (including tax shelter
opportunities) exist because of the inherent nature of legal rules as the results of
multi-criterial choices. See Leo Katz, “A Theory of Loopholes” (2010) The
Journal of Legal Studies 39(1), 1-31. Others argue that tax authorities engage in
some form of price discrimination. See Benjamin Alarie, “Price Discrimination in
Income
Taxation”
(2012),
manuscript
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1796284.
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there is little tax litigation. 143 The role for tax advisors will also be
limited, except to the extent that advisors know what the going rate
of discount is. In other words, the phenomena of low litigation
volume and low demand for tax advice can be explained by a
different type of informal collection practice than is emphasized in
Part III. 144
The deliberate “discounting” of legally imposed obligations,
through generally condoned informal (i.e. unregulated) bargaining
between taxpayers and tax administrators (or between regulated
subjects and regulators generally), is certainly distinct from the type
of deviation from actual legal standards analyzed in Part III. The
former implies obvious trade-offs of costs against benefits: for
example, it might reduce outright tax evasion (by offering discounted
tax payments), but it might also encourage collusion between
taxpayers and tax collectors. Unless the benefits clearly outweigh the
costs, such a policy is unlikely to be adopted. 145 By contrast, in Part
III, non-rule-based tax collection is portrayed as an inadvertent
consequence of decentralization: 146 it can be the outcome even if its
social costs outweigh its social benefits. This logic arguably gives
greater credibility to the account given in Part III than the possibility
that tax collectors deliberately negotiate tax payments below what is
known to be legally required levels.
Similarly, as already suggested in Part III.B, it is possible to
imagine informal dealings between taxpayers and tax collectors to be
rife with corruption, which would also result in low demand for tax
services and low tax litigation. However, unless one assumes that
there is a high tolerance for corruption, it is not clear that corruption
is the main way in which non-rule-based tax collection is engendered.
The point of Part III is to show that it is not necessary to make such
an assumption. Of course, ultimately, which of these possibilities—
deliberately ignoring legal standards as a result of either price
discrimination or corruption, or inadvertent but systematic ignorance
of applicable legal standards—more accurately characterize non143

An analogy would be that few people would dispute a speeding ticket if
no speeding is punished unless it is significantly above the speed limit, and if
moreover penalties are always negotiable.
144
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
145
It is not clear that a case has been made that “price discrimination” in tax
collection is an attractive policy option.
146
It was crucial for the analysis there that decentralization implies not just
cheap access to civil servants, but also, simultaneously, civil servants’ partial
ignorance of the law.
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rule-based collection practices in China or other developing countries,
is something that can be ascertained only through closer empirical
investigation in particular contexts. 147 This article does not resolve
this issue, but mainly identifies a plausible scenario that has not
previously been articulated.
It is also worth noting here that easy informal access to tax
collectors is not something that should be taken for granted for
developing countries. As a general empirical pattern, developed
countries tend to have a much higher number of tax administrators
relative to population than developing countries. Even in China, the
number of tax administrators relative to the size of the country’s
general workforce is much lower than the OECD average. 148 It is the
fact that these relatively few tax administrators are geographically
dispersed and heavily concentrated at the lowest bureaucratic rank
that allows taxpayers frequent access to them.
Finally, an overall question can be raised about the explanation
of non-rule-based tax collection offered in this article. In Part I, I
argued that Chinese tax collection currently relies too little on selfassessment and risk-based administration, and that this forms a
bottleneck on tax policy reforms. Yet Part I also began by noting that
the Chinese tax system has been relatively successful at revenue
mobilization, which is generally regarded as the more fundamental
challenge for the fiscal systems of developing countries. Could it be,
then, that the analysis so far has given unwarranted emphasis to selfassessment, risk-based administration, and other “modern” tax
collection techniques adopted in developed countries? 149 Even if
such techniques indeed have to be rule-based, there may be room for
debate as to whether they are in fact optimal in the context of
developing countries like China. For example, the discussion in Part
II.A suggests that in Chinese county-level tax bureaus, a large
portion of staff resources is devoted to ensuring that businesses
remain registered for tax purposes (and pay some taxes), even if this
results in each tax collector covering a large portfolio of taxpayers
and not being able to specialize in audits. But the importance of
keeping businesses registered (and remain in the formal economy)
147

See, e.g. Khan, Khwaja, and Olken, supra note 62 (finding evidence of
corruption in property tax assessment in Punjab, Pakistan, but that collusion
between taxpayers and tax collectors is far from uniform).
148
See Appendix in Leslie Robinson and Joel Slemrod, “Understanding
Multidimensional Tax Systems” (2012) Int Tax Public Finance (2012) 19:237–267
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I am grateful for two anonymous referees for both raising this important
question.
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has itself been stressed by IMF and other international
organizations. 150 If there has been a conscious trade-off in favor of
focusing on registration (at the expense of audit capacity), then one
may ask whether non-rule-based tax collection is truly an unintended
consequence of Chinese administrative decentralization.
This criticism indeed highlights certain unresolved paradoxes
in the Chinese tax system, as well as possible weaknesses in the
existing discourse on developing country tax administration in
general. Why tax revenue has grown faster than GDP in China since
1997 is a puzzle that has already attracted a small body of economic
research, although no definitive resolution has been found. 151
Moreover, as discussed in Part I, China’s tax structure is not
dissimilar to tax structures of other developing countries, which
many have argued are inefficient. 152 Yet the alleged inefficiencies
have at least so far not hampered China’s economic growth. One’s
views about how such apparent paradoxes can be resolved will likely
affect one’s evaluation of the effectiveness of Chinese tax
administration. Many believe in self-assessment and risk-based
administration as the appropriate goals of all tax administrative
reform; it is also the orthodox view endorsed by international
organizations. 153 Yet the belief in the superiority of self-assessment
and risk-based administration—and in rule-based tax collection
practice generally—is generally based on experience. Like many
other beliefs about tax administration, it has not been systematically
empirically verified. Therefore, like the question of how to properly
describe non-rule-based tax collection, the question of how to
evaluate it also requires further empirical research.
V.
DECENTRALIZATION AS A SYSTEMATIC FEATURE OF THE CHINESE
REGULATORY STATE
The previous Parts argued that excessive bureaucratic
decentralization has frustrated China in its attempts at modernizing
150

See e.g. IMF 2011 Report, supra note 8, at 22; Bird, supra note 36, at 37-

8.
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See, e.g. Li-An Zhou, Chong Liu, and Xing Li, “Tax Effort, Tax Bureaus,
and the Puzzle of Abnormal Tax Growth” (2011) (in Chinese) China Economic
Quarterly 11(1), 1-18
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See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
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This belief is shared by many senior tax officials in China. See notes 6264, 66 supra.
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tax administration in the last 15 years. Some readers may have
wondered by this point: why is Chinese tax administration so
decentralized? A full answer is beyond the scope of this article, but a
preliminary answer is especially useful for understanding the
character of explanation offered in this Article for the failure of tax
administration (and the rule of law) in a developing country. Three
points require emphasis. First, decentralization is a systematic
phenomenon in the Chinese regulatory state. Second, it came about
not as a result of routine policymaking in the stable development of
the state apparatus but is likely attributable to specific historical
processes and political forces beyond the control of ordinary
bureaucrats. Thirdly, it nonetheless falls within a dimension of
institutional design in which tax policymakers can at least carry out
moderate reforms, and in which a wider group of political actors may
decide to implement deeper reforms.
The type of decentralization that characterizes Chinese tax
administration is in fact shared by a majority portion of the Chinese
regulatory state. In most regulatory areas—be it business registration,
public health and food safety, environmental protection, policing,
education, labor and social security, land management, and cultural
and media regulation—the Chinese state is decentralized, i.e.
bottom-heavy in a geographically dispersed hierarchy. The few less
decentralized spheres of regulation, e.g. banking and securities
regulation, customs, etc. constitute exceptions to a general rule. 154
This general pattern has also been implicitly acknowledged by
recent social scientific scholarship of China. Some of the most
influential theories of Chinese political economy in recent years have
emphasized the role of decentralization in Chinese economic
development. 155 An important theme in this strand of the literature is
that, at the start of the process in the late 1970s that eventually led to
China’s abandonment of the planned economy, regional governments
in China, unlike their counterparts in the Soviet Union, were
characterized by an “M-type” instead of “U-type” economic
structures: divisions of labor in production and regulation occurred
within regions instead of across regions under the supervision of the
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See, generally, Li-An Zhou, Local Governments in Transition: Official
Incentives and Governance (in Chinese) (Shanghai: Anzhi Press, 2008).
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See, e.g. the theories of “market preserving federalism” in Jin et al, supra
note 22, and of “regionally decentralized authoritarianism” in Xu, supra note 22.
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central planner. 156 Consequently, Chinese regional governments
were able to experiment individually with the transition away from
the planned economy. Moreover, because each province faced
similar problems of economic growth with some others, the
performance of provincial political leaders can be compared. As a
result, there effectively developed “yardstick competition” among
provincial politicians in the promotion of economic growth during
the terms of their office. 157 Thus decentralization in regulatory
activities simultaneously made it possible and created strong
incentives for Chinese politicians to foster the development of
markets.
Underlying much of this theorizing is the assumption that at
fairly low levels of the state, local politicians still command a wide
range of regulatory tools. But this is basically the same as saying that
in a wide range of regulatory areas, administrative decisions are
made at very low-levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy—the
phenomenon emphasized in this article. Nonetheless, this article has
conceived administrative decentralization in a distinctive way
relative to the social scientific literature. First, that literature is vague
about the scope and meaning of decentralization. Some portray
provincial decision-making as decentralized, while others emphasize
that the logic of political competition reaches much further down. 158
From the perspective of this article, the phenomenon of
decentralization can be appreciated only when one focuses on the
county or even lower levels of government. 159 Second, the political
economy literature, not surprisingly, focuses on politicians who
have, through whatever faction or line of patronage that they joined,
become “generalists” who are evaluated by the results of governing a
particular territorial jurisdiction. Very little has been said about the
behavior and incentives of bureaucrats in local regulatory agencies—
within, so to speak, the more “Weberian” aspect of the Chinese state.
Third and relatedly, theorists have tended to see a major distinction
between whether a particular local government agency is “vertically”
supervised by a superior agency within the same sphere of regulation
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Hongbin Li and Li-an Zhou, “Political Turnover and Economic
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or “horizontally” controlled by a local chief executive office. 160 The
focus of this article, however, has been on consequences of
decentralization that emerges regardless of whether an agency (e.g.
tax bureau) is controlled vertically (as in the case of a country-level
State Tax Bureau) or horizontally (as in the case of a country-level
Local Tax Bureau or lower-level LTB post).
In any case, given that decentralization appears to be the
preferred general structure of government in China, it can be viewed
as exogenous to the design of Chinese tax administration: it is a
structure that a single bureaucracy, even one that is as large as
Chinese tax administration, may not be in a position easily to change.
The degree of administrative decentralization in taxation lies
beyond the scope of normal decision-making of Chinese tax
policymakers also in another sense: decentralization is likely the
result of specific historical processes. While it is certainly beyond the
scope of this Article to investigate the historical origins of
administrative decentralization in China, a brief narrative that throws
the institutional analysis given here in historical relief may help
underscore the significance and plausibility of the analysis.
Before the 20th century, the administrative state in dynastic
China was tiny: it had no more than a few thousand official posts,
and delivered very limited government services. 161 This may be
viewed as the historical predecessor of the very lightly-staffed higher
ranks of the contemporary Chinese bureaucratic state. What China
did not have back then was the massive population of civil servants
at the lower ranks of the state. Government functions in the lower
tiers came into being during the 20th century, as the Nationalists and
the Communists built government presences in rural China, to collect
more taxes and, later under socialism, to carry out collectivization. 162
A notable feature of this form of government expansion at grass-root
levels was that government agencies did not grow organically but
was spurred by totalitarian mobilization: political mobilization may
have allowed the government to extend its reach in ways that would
160
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not be efficient in periods of political stability and routine
bureaucratic management. Tax administration, for example, was
largely suspended during from the mid-1950s until the late 1970s,
during the planned economy era. But when it had to be rebuilt in the
1980s, it was built very quickly: 163 hundreds of thousands of tax
administrators were hired to be posted at local state-owned
enterprises and markets to collect taxes where none had been
collected before. 164 The management and use of such a veritable
army of dispersed low-rank tax collectors, however, pose very
different problems for the long term.
In other words, it is plausible to see decentralization in the
Chinese administrative state as the product of two fundamental
elements of the country’s past: (i) a (very) long history of a small,
centralized government apparatus that was incapable of performing
the functions of a modern state; and (ii) a shorter history (i.e. since
the 20th century) of a quickly expanding network of government
offices low in the administrative hierarchy, designed to carry out the
commands of totalitarian regimes and not to cater to the needs of a
stable market economy. In its current pattern of decentralization, the
Chinese administrative state still operates in the shadow of this past.
Clearly, these historical processes are beyond the control (and
perhaps even the reflection) of reformers within tax administration.
Explaining the failings of tax administration in terms of
decentralization in the Chinese regulatory state is appealing because
the latter is both a more fundamental phenomenon than the items
being explained, and, at the same time, amenable to change. It is
clearly conceivable for the government to decide to centralize tax
administration to a greater extent, whether (depending on the
particular administrative function concerned) to municipal,
provincial, or national levels. 165 To pursue administrative
centralization in the sense of staffing municipal and provincial tax
bureaus sufficiently so that they can directly deal with taxpayers,
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however, will be bureaucratically and politically difficult, if it is
done in isolation from broader bureaucratic reform. It would require
the deployment of political resources that bureaucrats in the SAT
either do not possess or are unwilling to expend. However, locating
the source of difficulty for reforming tax administration in the
broader configurations of the state should, in the long term, better
focus the “political will” to pursue reform. 166
CONCLUSION

This article sought to demonstrate that contemporary Chinese
tax administration displays many of the same flaws that characterize
tax administration in other developing countries, particularly the low
use of self-assessment and audits. I also showed that Chinese tax
administration is extremely decentralized, in a manner that is
determined by larger patterns in the organization of the Chinese state
and arguably unique moments in Chinese history. I then postulate a
causal connection between the two phenomena—between the
challenges faced by administrative reform and decentralization. The
causal hypothesis is motivated by the fact that many of the other
factors that are normally appealed to for explaining the limitation of
tax administration capacity in developing countries do not seem
present in the Chinese context. According to my hypothesis, the
causal mechanism from decentralization to the unattainability of selfassessment and audits runs through people’s ability and willingness
to acquire knowledge of the law. When decentralization negatively
affects people’s ability and incentives to inform themselves of the
content of legal rules, non-rule-based practices emerge, making selfassessment and many other tax administrative techniques irrelevant.
The rule of law is an essential component of the causal story to
which this article seeks to give plausibility. However, the way rule of
law makes an appearance here is very different from how it has
generally appeared in the tax and development literature. In the
existing literature, the rule of law, while normally agreed to be a prerequisite for modern tax administration, is viewed as an exogenously
given variable. Economists have been more willing to find some rule
166
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of law “indicator” as an independent variable in regression analyses
than to inquire into how the rule of law may emerge within tax
administration. 167 In this article, by contrast, whether the rule of law
will prevail depends crucially in the mundane but fundamental
decisions of taxpayers and tax administrators to find out what legal
rules there are. I argue that it is these decisions that determine the
larger aggregate outcomes observed at the institutional level, for
example whether there is a market for a certain type of legal advice,
and whether lawsuits will be brought to courts. 168 The “rule of law”
variable in the analysis here is clearly endogenous.
The causal story advanced in this article is capable of empirical
verification (and refutation). How much does decentralization affect
the level of knowledge and specialization of tax administrators? How
much do interactions between taxpayers and tax administrators
increase as a result of decentralization? How high is the level of
(perceived) corruption during such interactions? How much do
taxpayers substitute between third-party advice and conversations
with tax collectors? Are outcomes significantly different depending
on which is chosen? What is the respective significance of knowing
and unknowing deviations from the law? These are some of the
question that may be relevant to implementing an empirical test of
the causal hypothesis in this article. The analysis given in this article
is intended to show that these questions are worth asking, and that
answering them may allow us to better understand the role of law in
developing countries’ tax administration.
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